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CONTRACT, WARRANTY, AND THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Adam Candeub*
INTRODUCTION
You can allay fears that your car transmission will fail by
purchasing a 10-year/100,000-mile powertrain warranty, but you
cannot purchase a warranty against your surgeon botching your
appendectomy-or even leaving a sponge in your body. Why?
Imagine a world in which health care providers offered warranties,
which would necessarily vary with condition complexity and
physician skill. Doctors could offer minimal warranties for complex,
difficult-to-treat conditions, i.e., "I'll offer a warranty that you will
receive this experimental drug for your chronic disease-but there'll
be no warranty offered for a cure." The standard arm fracture
would receive a more complete guarantee: "You'll be fine in three
weeks or you won't have to pay me."
These warranties would ameliorate what economists call
medicine's information asymmetry-unlike purchasers of food in a
supermarket, consumers cannot verify what health care treatment
they need or if it was provided competently.' Because doctors make
more money by doing more tests, procedures, and exams-and
* Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Many
thanks to David Hyman, Charlie Silver, Stephen Morse, and Jennifer Arlen, as
well as the other commentators at the annual conference of the American Law
and Economics Association; the medical malpractice visiting lecture series at
the University of Illinois College of Law; and the 10th Anniversary Conference
of the University of Minnesota's Consortium on Law and Values in Health,
Environment & the Life Sciences.
1. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 947, 965-66 (1963). Arrow's argument is
not quite an "information asymmetry" argument, as he correctly points out that
both parties to the medical contract work under significant conditions of
uncertainty. Id. at 951. Consumers have trouble picking effective doctors, and
doctors have trouble picking effective treatments. The full significance of this
point as it relates to the effectiveness of, and accountability within, medicine is
discussed below. See infra Part I; see also Charles E. Phelps, Information
Diffusion and Best Practice Adoption, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
223, 225 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) ("The 'foot-
prints' of incomplete information can be found everywhere in health care
markets . . .. ").
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because third-party-payer insurance renders price invisible to
patients-physicians and consumers have incentives to do more
medicine than they should, facing little to no economic pressure for
cost effectiveness or even simply for safe, conservative medical
practice. Indeed, the matter extends beyond mere economics.
Unnecessary procedures performed without our full understanding
invade our bodily integrity; this market failing threatens personal
autonomy.
Health care economists attribute much of the excess cost of the
U.S. system to this asymmetry. We spend roughly twice as much as
do countries with state-controlled health care systems, which control
this asymmetry form the top down.2 This waste has been calculated
at roughly $700 billion a year, or one-third of all annual U.S. health
care costs.' The belief that health care provision is wracked with
inefficiency motivated the recent health care act ("Health Care
Act")-The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA")
and The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
("HCERA")'-with the White House acknowledging the elimination
2. See ELIZABETH DOCTEUR & ROBERT A. BERENSON, How DOES THE
QUALITY OF U.S. HEALTH CARE COMPARE INTERNATIONALLY? 10 (2009), available
at http://www.urban.org/publications/411947.html. The United States spends
15.3% of its gross domestic product ("GDP") on health care. See KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND SPENDING (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692-02.pdf ("U.S. health spending as a
share of GDP in 2006 (15.3% in [Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD")] accounting) was considerably higher than all other
OECD countries, including Canada (10.0%), France (11.0%), Germany (10.6%),
Japan (8.1%), and the United Kingdom (8.4%). Switzerland was a distant
second to the U.S., devoting an estimated 11.3% of GDP to health care."). All
these foreign countries have state-controlled health care delivery systems to
varying degrees, yet these countries are generally considered to provide health
care that is at least as good, if not better, than that of the United States. See
DOCTEUR & BERENSON, supra, at 10 (surveying existing literature and
concluding that "[tihe evidence suggests that other developed countries achieve
comparable quality of care while devoting at most two-thirds the share of their
national income").
3. In 1996, one set of commentators estimated that health care spending
waste approximated $40 billion. See John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and
the Debate Over Medicare Reform, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 13, 2002, at W96, W104,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/contentlearly/2002/02/13/hlthaff.w2
.96 ("Our estimates are based on 1996 spending. In that year, spending under
traditional Medicare was about $138.3 billion, and per capita spending reached
$4,990. If, on an age-, sex-, and race-adjusted basis, spending levels in the
lowest decile were realized in all higher regions, total spending would have been
just $98.2 billion, or a savings of $40 billion (28.9 percent)."). Peter Orzsag,
White House budget director and architect of the health care reform, updated
this number to $700 billion per annum given medical care inflation over the last
decade. See The President's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Budget, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Peter Orszag, Dir.,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget).
4. The Health Care Act is contained in two pieces of legislation, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
[Vol. 4646
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of this $700 billion waste as a chief goal.'
The Health Care Act adopts a top-down solution to the
asymmetry problem and its attendant spiraling costs, by creating a
bureaucratic mechanism through which government, by mandating
best practices and using its tremendous purchasing power
(Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Administration, and now
government-sponsored insurance exchanges), can demand more
efficient health care provision. The Health Care Act, at least
implicitly, assumes that consumers cannot effectively evaluate
medical treatments but must simply accept them, and, therefore,
that medical care is an appropriate area for government and
professional regulation. Private health organizations, such as
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), do (and have done) the
same thing in the private sector. While HMOs are effective at
reducing costs, their popularity has waned, it is claimed, because
patients reject their limits on choice and patient autonomy.'
Warranties could achieve the same ends as either public or
private top-down solutions. First, health care providers would not
offer treatments likely to fail because they would not be paid for
such treatments. This would solve the problem of what economists
call "demand inducement," i.e., the well-documented phenomenon
that physicians often prescribe unnecessary treatment when it is
financially advantageous to do so.9 Second, consumers could choose
(2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
5. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing the role of cost
savings in motivating the Health Care Act).
6. PPACA mandates this in numerous ways. For example, Title III
(Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care), Section 3001 links
payment for hospitals to quality outcomes under Medicare. See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3001. Sections 3002-3015 create
mechanisms for calibrating the quality of physicians and other health care
providers and basing Medicare remuneration on these scores. Id. §§ 3002-3015.
Section 3021 established the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to
research optimal quality standards and payment regimes. Id. § 3021.
7. See Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and
the Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957, 981 (2010) (recognizing arguments
that patients may not be able to effectively contract for medical services because
they are not sufficiently informed); William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, A
Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 270
n.104 (2002) ("Many health care services are what economists call credence
goods, meaning that consumers cannot necessarily assess their quality even
after consuming them.").
8. See Larry B. Benko, Loosening Their Grip: As HMOs' Popularity
Continues To Erode, More Plans Turn to Less-Restrictive Rules. But with Costs
Rising, What's Next?, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 15, 2002, at 30 (identifying
consumer frustration with lack of choice of providers as the cause for the
decreasing popularity of HMOs in the 1990s).
9. The physician-induced-demand hypothesis posits that physicians take
advantage of patients' ignorance by recommending treatment that they may not
need, thus "inducing" demand for medical services. See Rune J. Sorensen &
2011]1 47
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treatments based on their providers' credible assessments of risks
and benefits, rather than "trusting" their doctors. This would allow
for more efficient consumption of health care. Third, warranties
would solve a nagging problem in medicine-how to tell if your
doctor is any good. Better doctors would presumably offer more
expansive warranties. Fourth, warranties properly align incentives
by requiring doctors to have "some skin in the game," compensating
them only when they achieve the outcomes they promise.
Currently, physicians receive payment regardless of whether they
kill a thriving child with some breathtaking negligence or raise
Lazarus from the dead. Inappropriate incentives lead to
substandard performance." Fifth, medical warranties are not some
law academic's folly. Warranties are already emerging in some
areas of medicine, such as refractive surgery and fertility
treatments." This Article sets forth a program for expanding their
use.
While both warranties and top-down mandates aim to correct
inefficiencies in the current provision of health care, warranties
have numerous advantages. First, warranties reward excellent
doctors and allow them to easily distinguish themselves, while
mandated treatment protocols create no incentives for innovation.
Second, mandated standards, even if well supported and evidence
Jostein Grytten, Competition and Supplier-Induced Demand in a Health Care
System with Fixed Fees, 8 HEALTH ECON. 497, 497 (1999) ("[Demand
inducement] means overconsumption of medical services, generated by the
economic self-interest of physicians. The information asymmetry between the
financing body, the patient and the provider opens up the possibility for
physicians to inflate health service demand. If physicians are financed on a fee-
for-item basis, greater competition provides an incentive to exploit the
information advantage.").
10. While admittedly a radical idea, results-based payment or specified-
results treatment is not entirely new. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles
Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation for Health Care,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001). Professors Hyman and Silver focus largely
on the agency problem that traditional fee-for-service health care creates: the
doctor lacks any incentive to be successful and, therefore, can act as an
opportunistic agent. See id. at 1441-46, 1455-56. To fix the agency problem,
Hyman and Silver focus primarily on physician compensation. Id. at 1430-31.
This Article endorses their view and policy prescription but focuses on the
issues of signaling and information asymmetry.
11. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the
Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 893-94 (2005) ("Health care error rates are
higher than they should be not because providers fear malpractice liability, but
because providers have defective incentives and norms. Since providers often
lose money when quality improves, there is no 'business case for quality.'
Moreover, providers' norms and attitudes, which are often highly punitive,
impede efforts to improve quality by discouraging the creation of work
environments in which error-reporting and other predicates for quality
improvement can flourish.").
12. See infra Part II.B.
48 (Vol. 46
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based, cannot truly drive most medical decisions. Medicine involves
more than picking the right treatment from a standardized list; it
involves diagnoses and procedures. The former involve the ability to
detect subtle physical clues, which differ greatly among individual
patients. The latter involve, to use surgeons as an example, good
muscular control and sense of tissue. Protocols cannot tell
consumers which doctors have these skills. Third, due to the
difficulties of showing that any particular protocol should have been
used, mandates are not clearly superior to medical malpractice
standards for providing guidance to practitioners and protection to
consumers.
While warranties can powerfully signal quality, 3 any reform of
the informational basis on which consumers purchase health care
must also eliminate the legal barriers to obtaining credible
information about physician performance. The better information
parties have, the more effective contracting becomes. Many
proponents of a pure contract regime in medicine envision
information about physician quality emerging as it would for any
other good. For instance, they point to word-of-mouth or reputation
as working effectively to give patients adequate information about
doctor quality."5 Law, regulation, and norms, however, discourage
development of information.
Part I examines the problem of information asymmetry in
medicine as well as the top-down approach that many academics
advocate and that the Health Care Act adopts. Part II describes the
benefits of medical warranties, how they might function, and their
desirability in comparison to top-down approaches. In particular, it
examines "reverse subrogation," a proposed cause of action that
would allow warranties to function in a third-party payment regime.
Part III examines the legal and professional structures that stifle
the flow of information about provider quality and sets forth
suggestions for legal reform. Finally, Part IV examines the history
of physician-patient contracts, arguing that current contracting
conventions reflect the political economy, not the market.
13. See Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and
Producer Liability, 44 REv. EcoN. STUD. 561, 561-62, 569-71 (1977) (discussing
how guarantees function as indicators of reliability).
14. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Qualitative
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488, 488-90, 495-96
(1970) (discussing the inefficiency of contracting in the car market that results
from a lack of information); Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition
and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-72 (1973) (analyzing
consumer behavior in the absence of information about the exact qualities of a
particular purchase).
15. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? 415-16 (1999).
2011] 49
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I. INEFFICIENCIES IN MEDICINE: TOP-DOWN AND BOTiolm-UP
SOLUTIONS
Last year, at the beginning of the Obama administration's push
to pass the Health Care Act, Peter Orszag, White House budget
director and an architect of the reform, explained much of its
impetus in The Wall Street Journal. Orszag warned of skyrocketing
costs: "If costs per enrollee in Medicare and Medicaid grow at the
same rate over the next four decades as they have over the past
four, those two programs will increase from 5% of GDP today to 20%
by 2050."" He also stated that medicine is wracked with
inefficiencies and that "even doctors and hospitals agree that
substantial efficiency improvements are possible in how medicine is
practiced."" He concluded that "[wle don't seem to be getting
anything in exchange for the extra costs except more intensive tests
and procedures, and additional days in the hospital-and who would
want any of that if the additional tests and procedures do not
actually help to promote health?"' His solution: "changes in
financial incentives for providers so that they are incentivized
rather than penalized for delivering high-quality care." 9
Orszag explained elsewhere what "high-quality care" means.
Speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations, he stated,
[Ilt seems that higher cost hospitals and regions provide lower
quality, not higher quality, care.
And therein lies the opportunity. By replicating the best
practices in the high-quality, low-cost regions and hospitals,
we can boost quality and constrain costs in the long-term.
... [This can be done] by establishing an Independent
Medicare Advisory Commission-or IMAC-of doctors and
health experts to set Medicare reimbursement rates and
institute other reforms.
IMAC would issue recommendations that would either
improve the quality of medical care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries or improve Medicare's efficiency. 2o
The notion of a government board mandating "best practices"
for medicine led to Sarah Palin's famous characterization that the
16. Peter R. Orszag, Health Costs Are the Real Deficit Threat, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2009, at A13.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Prepared Remarks: A
Conversation with Peter R. Orszag (July 22, 2009), available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19897/preparedremarks.html.
[Vol, 4650
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administration supported "death panels."2 ' The uproar that followed
led to legislative language that scuttled any mention of end-of-life
counseling.2 2 But these prohibitions are likely cosmetic, as other
provisions of the Health Care Act empower Medicare to set
reimbursement schemes based on quality metrics.23 Indeed, only
these reforms can achieve the huge deficit reductions that the
administration promises.
Orszag's (and the Health Care Act's) analysis of medical care's
inefficiencies reflect widely accepted views among economists and
health care specialists. Economists have pointed out that physicians
"induce demand," meaning that physicians perform many
unnecessary procedures because patients cannot evaluate these
procedures' necessity or quality.25 Patients lack reliable ways to
measure physician performance, creating tremendous agency costs.
The fee-for-service reimbursement scheme creates no incentives to
perform competently, as doctors receive payment whether the
treatments succeed or fail.
The Health Care Act, and conventional policy thinking, may
underestimate the economic inefficiencies in health care. There is
little to no data linking total health care expenditures with positive
health care outcomes 2 7-which is particularly striking given that
21. Robert Coleman, The Independent Medicare Advisory Committee: Death
Panel or Smart Governing?, 30 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 235, 239-40
(2010). The St. Petersburg Times' political truth-sayer called Palin's
characterization the "Lie of the Year." Angie Drobnic Holan, PolitiFact's Lie of
the Year: 'Death Panels,' POLITIFACT.COM (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2009/dec/18/politifact-lie-year
-death-panels/.
22. Janet Adamy, End-of-Life Provision Loses Favor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
2009, at A4; Foon Rhee, Senators Eliminate End-of-Life Provision, BOSTON.COM
(Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009
/08/senate-paneldr.html.
23. See supra note 6 (pointing to sections in the Health Care Act that allow
the federal government to impose quality mandates on providers).
24. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks
-president-state-union-address ("[The administration's approach] would bring
down the deficit by as much as $1 trillion over the next two decades.").
25. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Essay, Conceptualizing,
Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 460 (1994) (explaining that asymmetric knowledge
between health care suppliers and patients allows suppliers to dictate how
much care patients need, thus allowing for abuse by physician-induced demand
for expensive services).
26. See NAT'L HEALTH CARE PURCHASING INST., THE GROWING CASE FOR
USING PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES To IMPROVE HEALTH CARE QUALITY (2001),
available at http://www.academyhealth.org/files/nhcpilincentives.pdf; Hyman &
Silver, supra note 10, at 1441-42.
27. See, e.g., Carolyn M. Clancy & Kelly Cronin, Evidence-Based Decision
Making: Global Evidence, Local Decisions, 24 HEALTH AFF. 151, 151 (2005)
(arguing that variations in health care expenditures do not uniformly translate
2011] 51
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into better health care outcomes); Carolyn M. Clancy & John M. Eisenberg,
Outcomes Research: Measuring the End Results of Health Care, 282 SCIENCE
245, 245-46 (1998) (explaining that incorporating patients' preferences in
treatment can increase positive outcomes more than increased spending);
Elliott S. Fisher, 2007 Robert and Alma Moreton Lecture: Pay for Performance:
More Than Rearranging the Deck Chairs?, 4 J. AM. C. RADIOLOGY 879, 879
(2007) ("The paradox, however, is that greater use of [supply-sensitive] services
[as a result of higher spending] has been shown to be associated with lower
quality, no gain in survival, and worse physician and patient-reported quality of
care."); Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care Quality, Geographic
Variations, and the Challenge of Supply-Sensitive Care, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. 69, 69-70 (2003) (explaining that geographic variations in care are not the
result of differences in spending on health care); Elliott S. Fisher, Medical
Care-Is More Always Better?, 349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1665, 1665-66 (2003)
(explaining that recent research indicates that "high intensity" care did not
generate better outcomes, but did increase spending); Elliott S. Fisher et al.,
The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health
Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 288, 297-98
(2003) (finding no relationship between Medicare expenditures and medical
outcomes); Paula M. Lantz et al., Socioeconomic Factors, Health Behaviors, and
Mortality: Results from a Nationally Representative Prospective Study of U.S.
Adults, 279 JAMA 1703, 1704-05 (1998) (demonstrating that the effect of
income on mortality at lower incomes was very strong regardless of spending
levels on health care); Robin Hanson, Cut Medicine in Half, CATO UNBOUND
(Sept. 7, 2007), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/09/10/robin-hanson/cut
-medicine-in-half/.
The RAND study of health care, which was designed to examine whether
managed care offered worse health care than fee-for-service care, constitutes
the most important evidence concerning the aggregate effectiveness of medical
care. See RAND HEALTH, THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT: A CLASSIC RAND
STUDY SPEAKS TO THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE REFORM DEBATE (2006), available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research-briefs/2006/RANDRB9174.pdf. The
study was a rare "experiment" in which individuals were randomly assigned to
various plans that differed in the degree to which they paid for health care. Id.
at 2. The experiment lasted from 1971 to 1982 and cost significant amounts of
money. Id. at 1-2. It randomly assigned over two-thousand nonelderly families
in six U.S. cities to three to five years of a specific payment regime, including
free, full price, and significant copay. Id. at 1-2. Not surprisingly, families that
paid less for health care consumed about thirty percent (or $300) more in per-
person annual medical services, though they spent less for hospital spending
and more for dental and "well care." JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL?:
LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 338 (1993) ("The more
families had to pay out of pocket, the fewer medical services they used."). The
study's primary conclusion was that "free care offers little benefit for the
average person." Id. at 356. Actually, that's an oversimplification. Of the
thirty-odd health care indicators examined, the free health care option did have
better outcomes in one medical sphere-blood pressure. Id. at 339.
Additionally, free health care resulted in better outcomes in vision and dental
care. Id. The study went on to conclude that "[tihe reduced service use under
the cost-sharing plans had little to no net adverse effect on health for the
average person." Id. Notably, however, the results of the RAND experiment
have been criticized on data-mining grounds. See, e.g., Hanson, supra.
Other, less epidemiologically impregnable research has looked for a
correlation between payment for health care and health care outcome. See, e.g.,
DAvID C. GOODMAN ET AL., DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT, REGIONAL AND RACIAL
VARIATION IN PRIMARY CARE AND THE QUALITY OF CARE AMONG MEDICARE
[Vol. 4652
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BENEFICIARIES (2010), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.orgdownloads
/reports/Primary-carejreport_090910.pdf; Elliott S. Fisher et al., Associations
Among Hospital Capacity, Utilization, and Mortality of US Medicare
Beneficiaries, Controlling for Sociodemographic Factors, 34 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 1351 (2000) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Associations]; Elliott S. Fisher et al.,
The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1: The
Content, Quality and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 273
(2003). Luckily, opportunities for this type of research abound, as there is
tremendous national variation in health care expenditures and provision.
Perhaps the most important line of research emerged from the Dartmouth Atlas
of Health Care Project. See GOODMAN ET AL., supra. This research tallied for
many years (and continues to do so as an inspection of its fascinating website
indicates) the total number and kind of medical treatments performed
nationwide in the Medicare program. See id.; see also Dartmouth Atlas of
Health Care, All Surgical Discharges per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees, by Gender,
DARTMOUTHATLAS.ORG, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/table.aspx?ind=59
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011). The amount of variation was quite surprising,
suggesting that local influence and custom play a far greater role in treatment
choices than does scientific evidence.
Researchers used this data to compare regional health care outcomes in
order to see whether expenditure correlated with better outcomes. They found
that areas with greater health care expenditures and greater numbers of
doctors did worse. See Edward Guadagnoli et al., Variation in the Use of
Cardiac Procedures After Acute Myocardial Infarction, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED.
573, 578 (1995) (demonstrating that treating heart attacks with a less
expensive procedure was just as effective as with the more expensive
procedure); Jonathan Skinner & John E. Wennberg, How Much Is Enough?
Efficiency and Medicare Spending in the Last Six Months of Life, in THE
CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: COMPARING NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT
INSTITUTIONS 183 (David Cutler ed., 2000).
Finally, studies have shown little to no correlation between spending and
outcomes using international comparisons. See, e.g., CHRIS L. PETERSON &
RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34175, U.S. HEALTH CARE
SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES (2007), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edulkey-workplace/311/; Deon Filmer & Lant
Pritchett, The Impact of Public Spending on Health: Does Money Matter?, 49
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1309 (1999). While specific intercountry comparisons are
hardly dispositive because they by definition involve comparisons of societies
often with vastly different diets and lifestyles, they are, at least from a
layperson's point of view, quite striking. For instance, the life expectancy in the
United States and Albania is, respectively, 78.14 and 77.78 years. See The
World Factbook: Country Comparison: Life Expectancy at Birth, CIA.gov,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank
.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). According to World Bank statistics from 2007,
the United States spends $7285 per year, per person on health care, while
Albania spends only $244. Health Expenditure per Capita, Worldbank.org,
http://data.worldbank.orgindicator/SH.XPD.PCAP (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
While Albania has a lower rate of homicide than does the United States, the
Albanians smoke more than Americans, with adult male smoking rates two to
three times higher in Albania than in the United States. See Judith MacKay &
Michael Eriksen, World Health Org., The Tobacco Atlas 94-100 (2007),
available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/atlas40.pdf (listing the smoking
rates for various countries); Intentional Homicide, Rate per 100,000 Population,
U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNODC&f
=tableCode:1&c=2,3,5,7,9,11,12&s=countryName:asc,yr:desc&v=1 (last visited
Jan. 28, 2011) (listing the homicide rate for various countries).
2011] 53
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other factors such as diet, wealth, smoking, and social status have
been linked strongly with significant health gains (or losses)."
While medicine undoubtedly does great things, it apparently also
does much that is indifferent or harmful. 9 Consumers have trouble
distinguishing between the two.
This strange ineffectiveness of medicine, while contradicted by
the popular reverence for "modern medicine," should nonetheless
not be surprising. As health care experts realize, very little of
medical practice stands on a firm evidentiary, scientific basis-
rather, physicians simply do as they were trained, as in some
medieval craft. Professor William Sage states, "Physicians
must ... grapple with the uncomfortable fact that, despite their
belief in the scientific foundation of modem medicine, relatively
little of medical practice is scientifically proven."so
The Health Care Act, and its academic supporters, not only
share a similar diagnosis of health care's problems, but also agree on
a treatment. Many policy makers believe that adoption of evidence-
based standards for health care provision-basing treatments on
rigorous empirical analysis and experimentation--can remedy
medicine's inefficiencies. 3' Echoing this chorus of scholars and
policy analysts, the Health Care Act empowers government to use
its tremendous purchasing and bargaining power to mandate best
practices based on sound evidence.2 A board will be created to
recommend best practices and craft reimbursement schemes to give
providers incentives to follow them.
This top-down approach is flawed in its limited ability to
empower patients. First, as doctors are fond of saying (particularly
when their treatments fail) medicine is not a science, it is an art.34
28. Hanson, supra note 27.
29. See Elliott S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unintended
Consequences of Growth in Medical Care: How Might More Be Worse?, 281
JAMA 446, 446 (1999) ("Although medical care has obvious benefits, many
assume that more medical care must lead to improved health and well-being.
There are theoretical reasons, however, to believe that additional growth will be
associated with progressively smaller returns . . . . The law of diminishing
returns also suggests that at some point additional growth will yield no benefit
(the 'flat of the curve'). And while the debate about where we sit on the curve is
far from settled, the theory suggests that there is some point at which
additional growth might actually produce harm." (footnotes omitted)).
30. William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error
167 (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 0587,
2005), available at http://Isr.nellco.org/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context
=columbia pllt.
31. See Peter Orzsag, Malpractice Methodology, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 2010,
at A39 (arguing that limiting the liability of doctors who follow evidence-based
guidelines will curb unnecessary tests and treatments).
32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3014, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119, 384-87 (2010).
33. Id. § 3021.
34. H.E. Setterfield, The Scientific and Humanistic Objectives of
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While that position may be self-serving, it is undeniable that
medicine-at least significant parts of it-cannot be reduced into
algorithmic guidelines. Medicine involves more than selecting
treatments from a menu. Most obviously, medicine involves
diagnosis: the reading of subtle, sometimes contradictory evidence.
While this skill is not reducible to guidelines, some practitioners are
clearly better at it than others. These practitioners likely possess
unconscious abilities or heuristics to detect and interpret evidence.
In addition, patients often have multiple conditions, with
treatments helping one condition but exacerbating another. The
physician must then optimize among inversely related treatment
outcomes-again a matter that guidelines, which focus on one
disease and one treatment, cannot resolve. Further, medicine also
involves plain old manual dexterity in performing procedures, like
surgery. Yet guidelines cannot mandate superior procedural skill.
Medical quality turns significantly on these skills. Consider
prostate cancer, one of the cancers men are most likely to suffer."
Such a cancer can be slow growing, posing little risk, or invasive,
posing life-threatening risk. Doctors have difficulty knowing when
treatment, such as surgery, is appropriate. Clear guidelines
certainly cannot tell when treatment is required. Yet, undoubtedly,
some doctors give better advice than others to patients who have to
make treatment decisions with only murky scientific evidence upon
which to rely. These doctors perhaps are able to weigh, in a manner
not reducible to algorithm, risk factors and other evidence. Further,
should prostate removal surgery ("prostatectomy") be required, it is
not costless; the patient risks, among other things, incontinence and
impotence.3 ' Avoidance of these highly undesirable complications
depends mostly on skillful technique, which involves an ineffable
skill at handling tissue and mastering the surgical environment.
Yet no guideline can mandate that.
Second, mandated guidelines have numerous perverse impacts
that result from the flawed attempt to reduce medicine into
algorithm. Because diagnosis is sometimes not clear, involving the
weighing of contradictory or subtle evidence, guidelines have the
incentive to make doctors "see," either consciously or unconsciously,
diseases with clear treatment mandates. They will not explore
other, more difficult possibilities. This will likely occur because even
if the patient does not get better, the doctor will still get paid,
provided he followed the guideline and had a reasonable justification
Premedical Education, 23 J. CHEMICAL EDUC. 330, 331 (1946).
35. AM. CANCER Soc'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2010, at 23 (2010),
available at http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/
@epidemiologysurveilance/documents/documentlacspc-026238.pdf.
36. See id. at 26-35.
37. Prostate Cancer: Treatment, NAT'L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov
/cancertopics/wyntk/prostate/page8 (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
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for applying it.
Third, guidelines do not reward excellence, at least to the
degree that excellence involves matters that guidelines cannot
capture, i.e., superior diagnostic ability or better surgical technique.
Instead, guidelines, building on the cognitive biases they create,
provide incentives for doctors to apply cookbook medical responses.
This may be desirable. Perhaps it would improve care. But, to use
the example discussed above, if anyone were facing prostate
surgery, he would want to know something about his urologist's
diagnostic and surgical skills, regardless of whether she followed
guidelines-mandated standards fail to provide patients the
information they most want.
Mandated guidelines do not provide incentives for innovation or
better consumer service but only for an accepted mediocrity. A
management nostrum, "wymiwyg" (what you measure is what you
get)-associated with Jack Welch, former General Electric CEO and
management guru -makes this point. If health care providers
receive payment for following guidelines, they will follow guidelines
and do little else.
Finally, guidelines do not account for an individual's risk
assessment. Some consumers might fear a certain disease-and
tolerate the possible bad effects of screening-and, therefore, want
more screenings than Medicare mandates or approves.
Global guidelines underestimate the information asymmetry in
medicine. Medicine is typically described as a "credence good." 9
Patients cannot verify a treatment's effectiveness or quality.40 Due
to the difficulties in measuring physician performance, consumers
must simply "trust and believe." Evidence strongly suggests that
trust in many doctors is misplaced;41 therefore, global guidelines
would improve doctors' performance, by encouraging them to apply
treatments that are well understood and clearly appropriate for the
patient.
38. JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GuT 387
(2001).
39. See, e.g., Astrid Selder, Medical Associations, Medical Education and
Training on the Job, 52 CESIFo ECON. STUD. 548, 551 (2006).
40. See James F. Blumstein, Antitrust Enforcement in the Health Care
Industry: A Battleground of Competing Paradigms, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 421, 421-22 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/04
-2008/Blumstein.pdf ("[In the health care industry, there is a] 'perceived market
failure'-an asymmetry of information between professional provider-experts
and uninformed (and uninformable) patient-consumers. The response to this
perceived market failure is that 'professional providers, such as physicians,
serve as substitute decision makers, displacing consumers.'" (quoting James F.
Blumstein, Of Doctors and Hospitals: Setting the Analytical Framework for
Managing and Regulating the Relationship, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 209, 219-21
(2007)).
41. See Huw T.O. Davies & Thomas G. Rundall, Managing Patient Trust in
Managed Care, 78 MILBANK Q. 609, 614 (2000).
56 [Vol. 46
HeinOnline  -- 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 56 2011
THE NEW HEALTHCARE LEGISLATION
Medicine is such that the correct mode of treatment is not
always known. Given that information deficits extend not only to
picking the right doctor but to the nature of medicine itself, simply
empowering a bureaucracy to make decisions about cost-
effectiveness, whether run by the government, an insurance
company, an HMO, or a panel of doctors, may not solve any problem.
The problem is not merely information asymmetry but a lack of
information per se.
In short, the distinction between risk and uncertainty-
associated with Frank Knight and later John Maynard Keynes-is
elucidating.42 People can measure risk. It is therefore suitable for
cost/benefit analyses and, indeed, global guidelines. One can predict
an event's likelihood and, therefore, estimate how much money
should be expended to prevent it. Lawyers are quite familiar with
this approach, as the famous Learned Hand formula reflects an
application of risk to create guidelines for behavior.4 ' This notion of
risk forms the basis of the medical guidelines that the new Health
Care Act envisions.
The problem with global guidelines based on risk is that
medicine involves not simply risk, but as Knight or Keynes would
say, uncertainty-risk that is not measurable.4 4 Uncertain events
may happen, but no one can really meaningfully predict their
likelihood. For some treatments or procedures, doctors can state
risk, e.g., you have less than a 0.01% likelihood of experiencing an
adverse reaction to a vaccine. For others, they simply cannot, e.g.,
whether you will be better off receiving chemotherapy or surgery for
certain types of cancer. Most importantly, global guidelines do not
even give doctors incentives to improve and innovate in order to
move from uncertainty to risk.
Variable warranties, on the other hand, force health care
providers to distinguish between risk and uncertainty and
encourage practitioners to learn to accurately gauge risk. Risk can
be warranted (for a price); uncertainty cannot. Doctors whose better
knowledge or superior skill and experience allow them to make risk
estimates will offer broader warranties, making more money. Less
knowledgeable or skilled physicians will wallow in uncertainty and
will not offer warranties.
Finally, a new proposal for market-based standards forwarded
by Professor Ronen Avraham offers a different solution.45 Avraham
42. Knight and Keynes argued "that the business environment is riven by
uncertainty in the sense of risk that cannot be calculated." RICHARD POSNER,
THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 280 (2010). I am indebted to Professor
Dan McCartney for his insight to apply this distinction to the health care
industry.
43. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (Hand, J.).
44. POSNER, supra note 42, at 280.
45. See Ronen Avraham, Private Regulation-A New Approach to the US
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suggests encouraging a market for private medical standards,
enforceable by patients in the event of a mishap. Private medical
research firms would compete to provide the "best" medical
standards." Medical providers would explicitly select a set of
standards. Patients could then sue the medical research firm that
produced the standard in the event of mishap-or the provider, if
the provider failed to follow the standard.4 9 Rather than a pure top-
down or bottom-up approach, Avraham offers a more middle-level or
"competitive" top-down approach. This approach constitutes an
intelligent, worthwhile reform, properly aligning incentives for the
medical profession to develop and follow evidence-based protocols.o
Indeed, as medicine becomes more algorithmic, Avraham's position
makes complete sense. But, to the degree medicine is not
susceptible to reduction and to the degree individual physicians can
distinguish themselves from the herd, warranties may make more
sense.
II. WARRANTY-BASED MEDICINE: A NEW MEDICAL CONTRACT
The following Part examines how a medical-warranty regime
would work with third-party payer insurance, including the legal
mechanisms it would require, such as the "reverse subrogation"
action, as well as other mechanisms aimed at similar ends, such as
requiring the bundling of health insurance with life insurance.
Currently, "medical malpractice" is the liability regime that
governs health care provisions. It is simply an implied warranty:
the so-called standard of care governs every medical contract-and
physicians cannot waive it. Under malpractice liability, a doctor
must perform according to the "standard of care," which is simply
what the average doctor would do in a given situation.5 ' A doctor
who fails to meet this standard is liable in tort.
Malpractice liability's weaknesses are manifest and well-
Healthcare Crisis (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 162, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1480982 [hereinafter
Avraham, A New Approach]; see also Ronen Avraham, Private and Competitive
Regulation of Medicine, EcONOMIsTS' VOICE (Aug. 2009),
http://www.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1629&context=ev; Ronen
Avraham, Private Regulation of Medicine: A Win-Win-Win for Doctors, Patients
and Public, HUFFINGTON POsT (July 22, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/ronen-avraham/private-regulation-of-med_b_242937.html.
46. See Avraham, A New Approach, supra note 45, at 40-41.
47. Id. at 7, 45.
48. Id. at 45.
49. Id. at 40-41.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining
an Elusive Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 430 (2009).
52. See FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3-4
(2008).
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documented, in terms of its expense (each dollar of compensation
consumes much more in transaction costs); lack of predictability and
effective compensation (it often compensates the wrong individuals
and, due to its expense, often fails to compensate the deserving); and
questionable deterrence value.53 Perhaps most important, medical
malpractice liability, like global standards, simply requires average
performance. Malpractice liability does little to remedy the central
problem in medicine-ineffectiveness-of which injurious
malpractice is merely a part.
Under a warranty system, individuals paying out of pocket
would have greater incentives to stay healthy because healthier
people would likely receive more expansive warranties. Indeed, that
incentive could create a true virtuous circle: warranties encourage
better habits, which in turn permit more generous warranties and
lower health care expenditures. Warranties could have the opposite
effect of the moral hazard of health insurance, which allows
individuals to avoid the consequences of their own unhealthy and
injurious decisions.
A. Medical Warranties in Practice
Applying warranties to health care would involve giving the
physician great flexibility in what to warrant and to what degree.
In other words, in every patient interaction there would have to be a
warranty of some sort, but physicians could decide what warranty to
offer. For example, if you went to a dermatologist to treat your
eczema, she would not have to guarantee a cure. Rather, she could
simply guarantee the diagnosis. However, if she failed to do what
she promised, you could get your money back.
Satisfaction or your money back could be just the beginning of
the potential variations in the contractual negotiation. Providers
and consumers could bargain over the extent of the warranty-all
the way from "I will give you this pill" to "I will keep you healthy for
one year." They could even bargain over consequential damages or
pain-and-suffering damages resulting from treatment. Or, possibly,
given the high cost of determining such things, a damages schedule
of some sort could be negotiated. The point is, as with all contracts,
the preferences of the parties would control, resulting in greater
efficiency. For instance, a health care provider might warrant "good
health for a year" to a consumer who has low blood pressure,
maintains a normal weight, and refrains from smoking. The
provider and consumer could even contract over the monitoring
mechanism, such as monthly blood tests to evidence continuing
healthy habits. Indeed, this warranty regime could emerge into
something like economist Robin Hansen's notion of "buying health"
53. See id. at 3-4, 17-20 (reviewing the current evidence of malpractice
liability's deficiencies).
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from providers, rather than having providers simply treat the sick. 4
There would be some situations in which no warranties would
be offered. In particular, emergency medicine is not a good
candidate for warranties. By definition, providers cannot make
intelligent guesses about risk in this area of medicine. Further,
emergency patients, especially those who are unconscious, facing
life-threatening injuries, or writhing in pain, likely lack serious
bargaining power.
The goal and hope of this system is that health care providers
would compete based on the extent, nature, and price of their
warranties. In this way, markets could be marshaled to create
information about the relative effectiveness of providers.
Warranties could serve as signals and markets as information
aggregators-as opposed to what medical markets are today,
information suppressors.
Warranties would work best in a high-deductible insurance
environment. This type of insurance requires individuals to pay the
first $2000 or $5000 either from a tax-favored medical savings
account or out of pocket. 5 Patients, therefore, would have a direct
incentive to get cost-effective treatment because they would benefit
financially from such treatment.
B. Warranty-Based Medicine Already Exists
However, would it work in practice? It seems at least possible
that doctors, if they were required to warrant, would not warrant
much at all. The warranties would be no more extensive than "I'll
give you this pill" or "I'll look at your eczema." Such warranties
would neither share risk nor signal quality.
To answer this objection, it is worthwhile to examine situations
in which warranties have already developed. They exist between
large health care third-party payers and providers. For instance,
Medicare has announced numerous events, known as "never
events," for which a hospital cannot claim compensation." These
events, such as catheter infections and falls, involve medical failures
that studies have shown can be avoided if health care providers
observe accepted protocols.
Medicare's list of "never events" constitutes a type of warranty
imposed by the government. The government is able to impose
54. See Robin Hanson, Buy Health, Not Health Care, 14 CATO J. 135(1994).
55. Robin Fisk, Patient Financial Responsibility Under High Deductible
Health Plans: What Providers Can & Can't Do if the Patient Can't Pay, HEALTH
LAw., Feb. 2006, at 16, 16.
56. See Kevin B. O'Reilly, No Pay for "Never Event" Errors Becoming
Standard, AM. MED. NEws (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews
/2008/01/07/prsc0107.htm.
57. See COLO. Bus. GRP. ON HEALTH, POLICY AND PROSPECTIVE ON 'NEVER
EVENTS' (2009), available at http://www.coloradohealthonline.org/cbgh/
?LinkServlD=EO5E6349-CFC5-ED82-30F881343DAF4459&showMeta=0.
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these warranties due to the massive purchasing power created by its
Medicare and Medicaid programs. In addition to "never events,"
Medicare is experimenting with "P4P," or pay-for-performance, in
which physicians would be rewarded for achieving certain successful
health care results on a practice-wide scale." Other government-
run health care systems are also experimenting with requiring that
guarantees be provided by drug producers. For instance, it has been
proposed that the United Kingdom's National Health Service
require that pharmaceutical companies guarantee a drug's
effectiveness in reducing a health problem, as evidenced by
nationwide population metrics, as part of the Service's agreement to
purchase a drug. 9 Finally, insurance regimes are beginning to
experiment with warranty-type payment schemes, under which
doctors are only paid for success. The "Prometheus" project is a
leading effort.o
Perhaps most significant of all, provider-to-consumer
warranties have emerged. Ophthalmologists offer warranties for
refractive surgery, the procedure in which lasers "shape" the cornea
in order to "cure" near sightedness (myopia). Indeed, as predicted in
this Article, these warranties are limited and differ according to the
patient.61 Warranties are also quite common in fertility treatments.
58. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Medicare "Pay For Performance (P4P)" Initiatives
(Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/medialpress/release.asp
?Counter=1343.
59. See Stephen Chapman et al., Setting Up an Outcomes Guarantee for
Pharmaceuticals: New Approach to Risk Sharing in Primary Care, 326 BRIT.
MED. J. 707, 707 (2002).
60. See What Is Prometheus Payment?, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES
IMPROVEMENT INST., http://www.prometheuspayment.org/?q=node/4/#/1 (last
visited Jan. 28, 2011). A team of health care economists, lawyers, and other
experts created the nonprofit Prometheus Payment system as a payment
regime that attempts to improve quality and distribute risk evenly between the
clinical and insurance sides of the system. See The Framework of Prometheus
Payment, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST.,
http://www.prometheuspayment.org/?q=node/61/#/2 (last visited Jan. 28, 2011);
History of Prometheus Payment, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST.,
http://www.prometheuspayment.org/q=node/60/#/1/1 (last visited Jan. 28,
2011). Prometheus uses "Evidence-Based Case Rates" to determine the total
resources required to deliver clinically appropriate care. See The Framework of
Prometheus Payment, supra.
61. See, e.g., 20/20 Guaranteed LASIK, BUCKLEY CHANG EYE INST.,
http://www.buckleyvision.com/colorado-springs/lasik/20-20-guaranteed
-lasik.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) ("There Are No Guarantees In Medicine-
How Can Dr. Britt Buckley Offer a 20/20 Money Back Guarantee? It's true-
Medical and surgical outcomes cannot be guaranteed because there are just too
many variables-BUT, when a surgeon has enough experience and historical
evidence to observe consistent 20/20 or better results, and truly happy patients,
he can express his confidence in your result by guaranteeing that you will
achieve your desired result or he will refund the full fee. Of course Dr. Buckley
can't offer a money back guarantee to you personally until he knows your vision
612011]
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Depending on the candidates' specific fertility evaluations, fertility
clinics will guarantee pregnancy or your money back after a certain
specified number of fertility treatments. An informal Internet
search uncovered over a hundred fertility clinics offering
warranties.6 3 Regular hospitals, doing normal procedures, have also
started to use them.64
It is worth examining the situations under which warranties
have emerged. On one hand, they have emerged when an entity
with great purchasing power-e.g., Medicare-bargains with
providers. Such large purchasers of health care are "price givers"
who have the ability to largely dictate terms. On the other hand,
they have emerged for procedures that are paid for out of pocket and
are not typically covered by insurance, like fertility treatment or
refractive surgery. It is worth pointing out, as well, that fertility
treatment and refractive surgery have clear measures of success-
the birth of a child, or improved vision.
The areas in which warranties are already being offered
objectives and confirms that your eye health and present vision characteristics
are likely to allow you to achieve 20/20 or better vision which is why his
involvement in personally reviewing your exam results is critical to the entire
process. Dr. Buckley is the only LASIK surgeon in Colorado Springs who offers
a 20/20 Money Back Guarantee . . . .").
62. See Chen May Yee & Josephine Marcotty, Infertility Treatment: Selling
Hope, STARTRIBUNE.COM (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.startribune.com/lifestyle
/healtI11346671.html ("With rising competition, some [in vitro fertilization
("IVF")] clinics are offering money-back guarantees and going farther afield to
look for patients."). Indeed, the New York State Attorney General's office has
issued an opinion about fertility guarantees. Press Release, Office of the Gen.
Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep't, Proposed Fertility Warranty Agreement (Mar.
27, 2002), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2002/rg203272.htm.
63. See, e.g., Cost of IVF at the Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago: High
Quality, Low Cost IVF, ADvANCED FERTILITY CTR. CHI.,
http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfprice.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) ("[W]e
offer several different affordable IVF-in vitro fertilization cost plans, including
pricing options with money back if it doesn't work."); IVF Guarantee,
DOMINIONFERTILITY.COM, http://www.dominionfertility.com/fertility/ivf
guarantee.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) ("Should a qualifying couple not
achieve a live birth, after receiving all of the indicated services (four IVF cycles
and the transfer of all frozen embryos obtained from each of four fresh cycles),
100% of the program fee will be returned."); The ARC Refund Guarantee,
ARCFERTILITY.COM, http://www.arcfertility.com/family-building/refund
guarranty.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2010) ("This program provides that after
receiving all of the required services you will be refunded most of the money you
have paid if a live birth (baby) has not been achieved through the IVF
treatments.... The pricing of the ARC Refund is determined after we have
received The ARC Program Application'. The cost of the program depends
upon many different factors like age, fertility status, [and] the type of treatment
package chosen. . . .").
64. See, e.g., Keith Gary, St. Luke's Hospital Guarantees Robotic Surgery
Results, LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE.cOM (Sept. 23, 2008),
http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/bethlehem/index.ssf/2008/09/stIukes-hospital
guaranteesr.html.
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illuminate the boundaries and potentials of medical warranties.
They certainly could not work in all situations. Emergency room
physicians are unlikely to offer warranties. (Although,
interestingly, some emergency rooms are beginning to guarantee a
maximum waiting period!)" Clearly, warranties would work best in
situations with easily verified outcomes and in areas of medicine
like refractive surgery, in which there is considerable competition.
They also would work best in situations in which patients "have skin
in the game." In others words, when patients are paying for
treatments out of their own pocket, they will have the incentive to
get the "better deal." In response to the explosion of high-deductible
insurance policies warranties seem an appropriate pro-consumer
policy.
C. Warranty-Based Medicine, "Reverse Subrogation," the Bundling
of Life Insurance, and MCOs
Warranty-based medicine may work best in an out-of-pocket
system, such as medical savings accounts. But it could also work
with third-party payer insurance, which dominates most health care
provision today, i.e., when we go to the doctor, insurance generally
picks up most of the tab. Warranties in a third-party payer system
would require enrollees in insurance plans to assign the proceeds
from any recovery to insurance companies-much like subrogation
clauses currently found in insurance contracts, which assign to
insurance companies any money recovered from medical malpractice
lawsuits that their enrollees bring. In "reverse subrogation,"
insurance companies could recover from providers for failed health
care and could even negotiate the terms of the variable warranty.
The third-party insurer would no doubt be in a better position to
prosecute individual claims against health care providers.
Insurance companies could also collect data on physicians'
performance globally and make that information available to
consumers. Such a "reverse subrogation" cause of action would
align insurance companies' incentives with those of consumers-or
at least improve the current alignment by giving providers an
incentive to provide effective treatment or else face a large corporate
plaintiff.67
65. To take one example, Mercy Hospital in southern Florida offers a
guaranteed waiting period in its emergency rooms. See ER Quick Care
Guarantee, MERCY HOsp., http://www.quickcareguarantee.com/ (last visited Jan.
28, 2011).
66. See 16 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§
222:25-:15 (2005).
67. For a similar concept, see generally Kenneth S. Reinker & David
Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by
Allowing Insurers To Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S261 (2007) (advocating
complete subrogation and assignment of tort claims to insurance companies on
the grounds that they can more effectively prosecute malpractice claims).
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In addition to variable warranties, one could imagine other
mechanisms, such as requiring bundling of life insurance with
medical insurance, to give insurance companies an incentive to
encourage providers to offer quality health care. Just as variable
warranties would give physicians incentives to provide health care
that at least fulfills their warranty, this type of insurance bundling
would give insurance companies the incentive to ensure proper
outcomes. Indeed, as discussed later in this Part, government and
private insurers are already moving tentatively in this direction.
Many scholars have proposed enterprise-based liability, in
which enrollees contract with their managed care organizations
("MCOs") not only for health care but also for medical liability.68
Under such a system, an MCO could provide different levels of
medical liability insurance to enrollees; MCOs would then negotiate
with health care providers for prices reflecting these different levels
of liability insurance. This proposal shifts all liability for medical
provider error to the MCOs, and then the MCOs would negotiate
levels of liability with their providers and enrollees. MCOs would
solve many of the bargaining problems inherent in contracting
liability. First, it would ameliorate the collective-goods and time-
inconsistency problems that Professor Jennifer Arlen points out.o
MCOs could offer their insurance subscribers provider networks
whose members all offer a standard of liability." MCOs could then
use their vast bargaining power and informational advantages to
receive the best prices for the level of liability chosen. Unlike
individuals, they would have the incentive to invest in collective
safety measures for the long run." Insurance companies would have
an incentive to bargain for effective health care, whereas under the
current system, they only have an incentive to provide cheap health
care. In addition, MCO-based liability would allow individuals to
bargain, indirectly at least, for the level of insurance they want.
In short, MCO-based liability offers many of the same
advantages as this Article's proposed warranty-based medicine. The
following discussion compares these two proposals, and concludes
that warranty-based medicine could be incorporated into an MCO-
based liability regime and still offer unique benefits.
68. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed
Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STuD. 491 (1997) (arguing for limited contractual liability for
MCOs); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for
the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2000) (advocating for
contractual enterprise liability for MCOs).
69. See Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Malpractice Liability 53 (Am. Law
& Econ. Assoc. Annual Meetings, Paper No. 42, 2008), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2627&context=alea.
70. See id. at 53-57.
71. Id. at 53.
72. See id. at 53-57.
73. See id.
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Perhaps the biggest difference between MCO-based and
warranty-based liability is that the latter shifts emphasis onto
providers, not insurers. As the Coase theorem would hold, the least
cost avoider should bear the risk.74 In the health care context, the
identity of the least cost avoider turns significantly on the type of
investment needed to improve medical safety and effectiveness. It
seems that if safety and effectiveness measures constitute large,
long-term, fixed investments, then the MCO rather than the local
doctor should bear the risk. The MCO, due to its enormous enrollee
pool, would have the bargaining power to make the large, systemic
investments in health safety and effectiveness that would recoup its
investments. This argument admittedly has less force when the
provider is a large hospital or clinic. On the other hand, if safety
and effectiveness require incremental costs particularized to
patients, then it would seem that providers, who have superior
information, could more cheaply make these decisions.
Whether providers or MCOs are the least cost avoiders is an
empirical question. As discussed above, there is evidence that
incremental investments (using magic markers to color the right or
left side of the body before surgery, prescribing antibiotics on a
standardized basis, etc.) may improve health outcomes. However,
this may not be the case and is a matter for further study.
One advantage that warranties have over MCO-negotiated
liability standards is informational. Under the MCO-negotiated
approach, each MCO would create a "uniform insurance plan[] in
which every provider in the plan network [is] subject to a uniform
liability rule (and uniform standard of care) and any patient seeking
care from that provider [has] to accept those liability terms, without
any ability to alter liability thereafter."6
Warranties, on the other hand, could be precise, specific, and
tailored to the doctor and the patient. This would create a market
in warranties, allowing a more precise alignment of the patient's
preference for safety and willingness to pay, the effectiveness of
treatments, and the provider's performance. Indeed, it is precisely
this alignment that supporters of a contract approach make when
arguing against the medical malpractice standard of liability."7 This
same argument, therefore, seems appropriate in preferring
warranty-based medicine over enterprise-based medicine.
It has been proposed that medical liability be completely
74. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1
(1960).
75. Deborah F. Mulloy & Ronda G. Hughes, Wrong-Site Surgery: A
Preventable Medical Error, in PATIENT SAFETY AND QuALITY: AN EVIDENCE-
BASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSEs 2-381, 2-387 to 2-388 (Ronda G. Hughes ed.,
2008).
76. See Arlen, supra note 69, at 55.
77. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 413-14 (identifying the problems with a
one-size-fits-all medical liability system).
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subrogated so that individuals could assign their medical
malpractice recovery to insurers in exchange for lower premiums.
The benefits are obvious. If MCOs provided liability, they could use
their bargaining power to obtain better safety and effectiveness
measures. Warranty liability, if assignable, could work in the same
way. Third-party payers could contract for warranty liability, and
third-party payers could efficiently prosecute these contractual
claims.
III. MEDICAL WARRANTIES FURTHER ECONoMiC EFFICIENCY
This Part examines several ways in which mandated warranties
can improve economic efficiency. First, mandated warranties can
function as a means of disclosure, for they indicate those parts of
treatment in which a physician has almost complete confidence.
Second, when warranties place risk on the party who can bear it
most cheaply, warranties themselves can enhance efficiency,
particularly when two separate prices (one for the service, the other
for the warranty) are quoted.
A. Warranties Provide Disclosure
As a general rule, disclosure enhances efficiency. When a
producer can provide, convey, or obtain the pertinent information
about a service at a lower cost than can a consumer, mandatory
disclosure may be appropriate. Such disclosure provides the
market, in a cheap way, with the information that will allow
consumers to buy things that best match their ideal preferences,
resulting in economic efficiency.
Required warranties are a form of disclosure because they
demonstrate the confidence, or lack thereof, that a physician has in
treatments or parts of treatments. Obviously, a physician can
provide this information more cheaply than can the health care
consumer. With this information, a consumer could presumably
"shop" for the physicians with the most expansive warranties.
Warranties may also signal quality. It has long been claimed
that a warranty's price and the extent of its coverage "signals" to
consumers the quality of a firm's product. This claim provides the
basis for signaling theories of warranty practices.o
78. See Reinker & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at S261.
79. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMic ANALYsIs OF LAw § 4.6, at 112-13
(6th ed. 2003).
80. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets
for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1396-97 (1983) ("Proponents of signaling theory assert that a
warranty 'signals' to consumers the quality of a firm's product. Such
explanations rest on four assumptions: (1) Consumers cannot distinguish
among competing products based on their likelihood of failure; (2) Consumers
believe that product quality correlates positively with the extent and duration
of warranty coverage; (3) The cost to firms of making warranties varies
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As discussed more fully below, some might argue that variable
warranties are ineffective signals of liability because of time-
inconsistency problems. Specifically, if a provider were to offer a
more expansive warranty at a higher price to signal his competence,
the rational consumer would choose the physician, but not take the
warranty because the consumer would know that the doctor was
good and that the warranty was unnecessary.' Therefore,
physicians would never offer such warranties.
There are a few responses to this argument. First, even if
patients, in the end, did not pay more for the warranty, it is not
clear that providers would not make one, particularly if some sort of
warranty were mandatory. This is because consumers would still
choose the provider making the more expansive warranty and,
therefore, it would be a way of attracting more patients, even if it
were not a way of providing additional revenue. Further, empirical
reality undercuts the model's claims. Contrary to the model's
expectations, doctors are in fact offering warranties, particularly in
refractive surgery and fertility treatment."
Most important, this argument largely assumes that there are
two kinds of doctors, good and bad, and that doctors cannot choose
to perform better or worse. This is not terribly realistic. Some, if
not most, doctors can be variable in their efforts. A warranty could
ensure that every doctor did his or her best. The sort of "lemon"
situation envisioned would not necessarily occur because patients
would not forgo the warranty in order to ensure the physician
performed at his highest level.
B. Warranties Generally Enhance Efficiency
Warranties are efficient, many have argued, because they
permit the party that can most cheaply bear the cost of failure to
inversely with product quality-the more likely a product will fail, the more
expensive it will be to comply with warranties for that product; (4) If firms do
not signal their level of product quality to consumers, the consumers will
assume that average quality in a market is relatively low. Were consumers to
suppose average quality to be high, firms would exploit them by selling low
quality products at high quality prices. Based on these four assumptions,
warranty coverage should correlate positively with product quality." (footnote
omitted)).
81. See Arlen, supra note 69, at 7 ("Negotiable contractual liability cannot
be used to signal quality because any patient negotiated with a provider who
has offered to bear liability has a strong incentive, if he believes the signal, to
request that the provider accept a liability waiver in return for charging a lower
price. This undermines signaling, however, because low quality providers can
mimic the contracts of high quality providers, knowing that patients will waive
liability. As a result, patients will not value liability as a signal of pre-
contractual quality and thus will waive optimal liability when the primary
benefit of liability is to induce pre-contractual investments in care." (footnotes
omitted)).
82. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
2011]1 67
HeinOnline  -- 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 67 2011
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
bear the risk of that failure. 3 It has been recognized that certain
types of warranties do this better than others. Standard warranties
combine the insurance costs of individual product risks with the
costs of production and distribution." This grouping can mislead
consumers in their efforts to estimate risk when the insurance
portion of an item's cost is obscured. A simple solution is to use
"modified warranty pricing," a pricing mechanism that separates
production and distribution costs from the costs of insuring specific
product risks. In effect, the manufacturer quotes a price for the
product, plus a price for each warranty provision offered.5
Thus, warranty-based medicine provides two-part pricing. This
two-part price could be set forth by the doctor's own offer: a
physician can charge more for more extensive warranties.
Similarly, the insurance amount could be revealed by comparison
shopping: a physician may offer a more extensive warranty for a
higher price than the price charge by a competitor with no warranty.
C. Would Patients Bargain for Warranties?
Finally, the nagging question in this Article's entire proposal is
whether patients would actually bargain. More specifically, would it
be efficient for physicians and patients to bargain over the extent of
the warranty? Several arguments suggest that it would not. First,
one might ask why warranties have not developed without legal
intervention. If they are so efficient, one would expect to see them
emerge. Physicians are free to contract above the medical
malpractice standard, yet they rarely do. If warranties do not
emerge on their own, that might support the view that they do not
offer any efficiency advantage.
Professor Jennifer Arlen has made a powerful argument, based
83. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 80, at 1398-99 (discussing the
theory of comparative advantage in the context of defects in refrigerator motors
and asserting that "[tihe theory in this context rests on six assumptions: (1)
Firms can reduce the costs of defects in refrigerator motors more cheaply than
consumers because firms have more expertise regarding motors and benefit
from economies of scale in buying repair tools; (2) Consumers can better ensure
the durability of refrigerator doors and shelves because these items are best
preserved through careful use; (3) Consumers are perfectly informed as to the
risk of product defects and know what steps are necessary to reduce this risk;
(4) Search costs are zero--consumers can costlessly observe every price and
contract term that all firms in the market do or could offer; (5) Consumers
minimize net purchase costs; (6) Firms maximize profits").
84. See Mark Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing
Mechanism, and Products Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1062-63 (1988).
85. See id. at 1063-64 ("In general, the manufacturer is the party best able
to make accurate estimates of product risks .... Were consumers charged
separate prices for discrete product risks, they could infer the manufacturer's
estimated valuation of each risk. Such an isolated price provides the consumer
the best available information regarding a particular aspect of the product's
quality and allows for an informed decision whether it is cheaper to self-
insure.").
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on this intuition, that contracting over medical liability would not be
efficient. She points out that risk-reducing investments tend to
have three features:
(1) [Tlhey are "collective" in that they benefit many patients,
(2) they are "durable," in that they reduce the risk of error for
both existing and future patients, and (3) they are
discontinuous (or "lumpy") [i.e., these costs are large and fixed
in comparison to the money that individual patients spend]. 6
These features give the patient "strong incentives to waive
contractual liability, even when state-imposed liability would be
optimal, because his individual waiver will have little effect on the
provider's incentives to make substantial systemic investments."
These features diminish the incentives for patients to bargain
for liability. First, as Arlen points out, most of these long-term
investments already have been made (or not made) when a patient
enters into a contract with a provider.8 Second, because these
safety investments benefit all patients, and there is a small
probability that they would directly benefit any given patient, each
individual patient has the incentive to free ride on others'
bargaining.8 Applying these insights to warranty-based medicine, it
would seem that individuals would have little incentive to bargain
for better warranties because they could only be offered if the
provider had made long-term, fixed investments.
There are several responses to these points. First, it is an
exaggeration to claim that all, or even most, costs associated with
safety are large and fixed. To the contrary, some of the most
important safety innovations simply involve small per-patient
incremental costs. For instance, many hospitals require magic
marker colors to designate on which side (right or left) a patient is to
have surgery, or require a "time out" when surgery begins in order
to ensure that basic safety checks are made.o And the simple act of
86. Arlen, supra note 69, at 5.
87. Id. at 6.
88. See id.
89. See id. ("This incentive to waive [liability bargaining] is exacerbated by
the fact that a patient who waives can 'free-ride' on investments induce[d] by
the liability imposed by others since providers who invest in safety tend to
apply these investments to all their patients, regardless of their liability
provisions.").
90. See Mulloy & Hughes, supra note 75, at 2-387 to 2-388 (discussing
marking and time-out procedures). Many commentators argue that these small
innovations vastly improve medical safety. See, e.g., Mary R. Kwaan et al.,
Incidence, Patterns, and Prevention of Wrong-Site Surgery, 141 ARCHIVES
SURGERY 353, 357 (2006) (showing that two-thirds of wrong-site surgery could
be eliminated through adoption of standardized safety protocols); Stephen
Schenkel, Promoting Patient Safety and Preventing Medical Error in Emergency
Departments, 7 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1204, 1205, 1209-10 (2000) (showing
how basic procedures, like checklists, can reduce iatrogenic injury); Samuel C.
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hand washing has proved the most effective way to prevent the
spread of infections in hospitals.9'
Second, as Arlen admits, the existence of MCOs-large third-
party payers-could alleviate the bargaining asymmetry. Unlike
individuals, MCOs do have the incentive to bargain for long-term
investments benefitting all of their enrollees." As many have
argued, MCOs could contract with enrollees for medical liability.9 4
MCOs could then bargain with health care providers for safety
measures.9 5 But, as Arlen points out, requiring MCOs to contract for
liability could very well create an adverse-selection problem 9 -a
problem that this Article's warranty-based medicine proposal
arguably avoids.
Moving away from an economic analysis, there are significant
norms that discourage bargaining over any aspect of medical care.
While not susceptible to a clear definition, a norm is generally a
rule, the violation of which is punished with some social sanction or
loss of standing or prestige. Medicine has always operated within
the context of norms, both for physician and patient. The former is
supposed to give the patient the highest standard of care and should
always act in the patient's best interest. Doctors who appear
mercenary, opportunistic, cruel, or compassionless violate the
professional norms, and generally receive a social sanction of
diminished respect. As mentioned above, physicians, perhaps as a
Seiden & Paul Barach, Wrong-Side/Wrong-Site, Wrong-Procedure, and Wrong-
Patient Adverse Events, 141 ARCHIVEs SURGERY 931, 934-936 (2006) (observing
that wrong-site surgery is quite common and arguing that patient safety can be
improved through the adoption of basic protocols from other industries).
91. See Hand Washing: Do's and Don'ts, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/hand-washing/hq00407 (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
92. See Arlen, supra note 69, at 4, 24 & n.75.
93. See id. at 55-57.
94. See, e.g., supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text; see also Danzon,
supra note 68, at 492 (noting the growth of MCO liability through contracts);
Havighurst, supra note 68, at 8 (arguing that "health plans, and not individual
doctors, should be legally accountable in the first instance for the quality of care
delivered to patients just as they are currently accountable to employers and
consumers for the cost of care").
95. See Arlen, supra note 69, at 2, 32.
96. See id. at 7, 57-62.
97. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DIsPUTEs 127 (1991). The literature of norms and social behavior is, of
course, enormous. See Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Model of Social Norms:
Further Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 465, 465 (2002) ("One of the most notable
trends in legal scholarship is the explosion of writing on social norms."). Not all
writers view norms as rules with "social punishments," as opposed to torts or
criminal laws that punish with fines or imprisonment; some explicitly adopt
broader definitions. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("In these ways, a norm is like a
law, except that a private person sanctions the violator of a norm, whereas a
state actor sanctions the violator of a law.").
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result of these norms, do not like discussing fees-let alone
bargaining for levels of care.98 Such bargaining would violate their
professed ethical duty to do their best for each patient.99
In addition to the medical-professional norms, there are norms
for patients. Physicians expect patients to be "good patients," a
phenomenon that has been extensively studied and documented.'00
One group of physicians writes, "As clinicians and medical
researchers, we have been taught and socialised to think, write, and
act as physicians, but we, and our friends and families, have also
been patients. We all try to be good patients.""" Good patients are
supposed to be trusting, cooperative, noncomplaining, and
nondemanding.10 2 In general, "good patients" receive more attentive
care.'o Again, tenacious bargaining does not fit into the role of the
"good patient" and might possibly diminish the quality and certainly
the experience of health care received.
These norms undoubtedly exist and arguably impede patients
from becoming effective consumers; indeed, they create a cost for
such patient behavior. A law mandating the disclosure of
warranties, if any, could help end this confining norm and make
warranties both accepted and expected.
D. Warranties Offer Lower Transaction Costs Than Medical
Malpractice
Warranties reduce transaction costs, at least compared to
medical malpractice." First, the current malpractice standard in
98. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts,
Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 653-54
(2008); Howard Stein, The Money Taboo in American Medicine, MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY, Fall 1983, at 1.
99. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (Am. Med. Ass'n 2010).
100. See, e.g., Steven R. Hans et al., The Difficult Doctor-Patient
Relationship: Somatization, Personality and Psychopathology, 47 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 647 (1994); Michael P. Kelly & David May, Good and Bad
Patients: A Review of the Literature and a Theoretical Critique, 7 J. ADVANCED
NURSING 147 (1982); Bauke Koekkoek et al., "Difficult Patients" in Mental
Health Care: A Review, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 795 (2006); Marilyn
Macdonald, Seeing the Cage: Stigma and Its Potential To Inform the Concept of
the Difficult Patient, 17 CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST 305, 307 (2003) (explaining
that a patient who is not "good" is one "who does not assume the patient role
expected by the health care professional, who may have beliefs and values or
other personal characteristics that differ from those of the caregiver, and who
causes the caregiver to experience self-doubt"). See generally FELICITY
STOCKWELL, THE UNPOPULAR PATIENT (1984).
101. Alejandro R. Jadad et al., I Am a Good Patient, Believe It or Not, 326
BRIT. MED. J. 1293, 1293 (2003).
102. Judith Lorber, Good Patients and Problem Patients: Conformity and
Deviance in a General Hospital, 16 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 213, 213 (1975).
103. See id. at 222-23.
104. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006)
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tort uses an implicit warranty that is vague. If one wishes to
recover, one must show that the doctor performed below his or her
community's standard of care, that this failure caused the injury,
and that damages resulted."o' Generally, enforcing a standard,
rather than a rule, is costly,'06 and so it is with the medical contract.
A physician's reasonable duty of care is a remarkably vague
standard. Assessing it requires a trial with a battle of experts that
jurors-probably not the best qualified to do so-must decide.
Evidence shows that medical malpractice litigation is wasteful, time
consuming, and, to some degree, inaccurate.o7
Second, the medical malpractice standard does little to elucidate
provider competence in any fine-grained manner. Given that the
standard reflects what an average physician would do-indeed,
often in practice, an average physician within the community-a
doctor who has a clean malpractice record is within a standard
deviation or two from average, either better or worse. Being born in
Lake Wobegon provides a better signal.
Third, high rates of false positives and negatives render
malpractice an imprecise signal. Some studies, particularly the
famous but hotly disputed Harvard Study, show that medical
malpractice fails to compensate the true victims of malpractice while
those who experience a poor result, without being victims of
negligence, often do well by the system.0 o Other studies dispute this
result.'09
Fourth, the process is costly, consuming over one dollar in costs
for every dollar in compensation."0 There is some evidence the
standard leads to "defensive medicine"; doctors perform more tests
than would be optimal in order to protect themselves from
liability."' In addition, there is evidence that medical malpractice
("The overhead costs of malpractice litigation are exorbitant.").
105. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 14-16 (2005).
106. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 (1992).
107. Florence Yee, Note, Mandatory Mediation: The Extra Dose Needed To
Cure the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 393, 407-09
(2006).
108. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991).
109. For a recent study, see Studdert et al., supra note 104, at 2024 ("Most of
the claims that were not associated with errors (370 of 515 [72 percent]) or
injuries (31 of 37 [84 percent]) did not result in compensation; most that
involved injuries due to error did (653 of 889 [73 percent]).") Professor Tom
Baker reviews a number of studies, finding mixed results. See BAKER, supra
note 105, at 77-82.
110. Studdert et al., supra note 104, at 2028-29.
111. The notion of "defensive medicine" is quite hard to define. Doctors
certainly believe that they perform more tests and other procedures than
necessary due to the fear of litigation. See David M. Studdert et al., Defensive
Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice
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deters entry into the profession, as those states with high
permissible medical malpractice damages have fewer entering
112physicians.
IV. BEYOND WARRANTIES: How LAW AND REGULATION SQUELCH
PHYSICIAN-QUALITY INFORMATION
In a world without warranties, how do individuals make health
care decisions regarding quality? Many people rely on reputation
and the advice of other doctors in choosing doctors. Others simply
trust their insurance companies and look up the name of a doctor in
the insurance company's doctor listings. But, do people trust (or
behave indifferently) because trusting or indifference is good--or do
they trust because other types of verification are not available?
Consider how we learn about the skills of other service providers in
areas in which consumers lack the expertise and experience to
evaluate the service provider. When evaluating an investment
advisor, one can look at past performance. When picking a litigator,
one can examine trial win/loss records. When picking a contractor,
one can ask past customers, inquire about the contractor's intended
methods and procedure, and compare estimates. In short, we make
decisions about quality and consumption based on past performance,
word of mouth, price (higher price tends to signal quality), brand,
current practice, certification, and advertising.
With medicine, however, these sources of information and
signals are absent. Many claim that medicine's inherent complexity
creates the information dearth.113  This Part shows, however, the
degree to which law and regulation prevent the availability of this
information.
A. Past Performance
Examination of past errors, or lack thereof, yields reliable
quality information, provided that past is prologue, a reasonable
assumption in most contexts. However, information relating to
Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612 (2005). However, as Baker points out,
"[Nione of the researchers who have studied defensive medicine have claimed
that they are able to separate the wasteful effects of malpractice lawsuits from
the good, injury-prevention effects." BAKER, supra note 105, at 119.
112. For a very thorough and sophisticated investigation of these issues
(with ambiguous results), see Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Medical
Malpractice Reform and Physicians in High-Risk Specialties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD.
S121 (2007), and David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor
Away? Evidence from Tort Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S143
(2007).
113. See, e.g., Qing Zhang, The Chinese Regulatory Licensing Regime for
Pharmaceutical Products: A Law and Economics Analysis, 15 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 417, 424 (2009) ("Given the considerable technological
complexity of medicine, consumers often have insufficient information to choose
the right medicine for themselves.").
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medical malpractice settlements is typically kept secret, as federal
and most state law permits parties to agree to keep settlements
confidential. 14  Apparently, parties, particularly those in medical
malpractice cases, take advantage of this option. A recent study of
sealed settlements in federal courts reported that personal injury
cases constitute the largest single category (thirty percent) of all
sealed cases."5
This allows litigants to convert a public good-information
about a physician-into private gain. In other words, the successful
malpractice plaintiff agrees to keep quiet about the settlement in
exchange for additional money, which the physician will pay to
"protect" his or her reputation."6 This is particularly egregious in
the medical malpractice context because a rule requiring secrecy
would likely be quite effective at inhibiting the free flow of
extremely scarce and socially valuable information.
Some argue that parties could engage in forum shopping to
bring suit in jurisdictions with more protection than others."'
Generally, however, the medical malpractice plaintiff is limited to
the venue in which he or she can bring suit, i.e., his or her place of
residence or the place of treatment, and generally lacks a basis for
federal-question or diversity jurisdiction."" Some commentators
also argue that because parties could settle the dispute before the
claimant files suit, antisecrecy rules would in fact lead to less
information being made available to the public."' However, most
states already strongly encourage medical malpractice claimants to
settle out of court, and indeed most suits already do.120 Finally, it
114. With few exceptions (such as New Jersey and Florida), most states
allow parties to contract to keep medical malpractice settlements secret
pursuant to court rule or discretion. See Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation,
Transparency, and the Public Interest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 232, 233-
34 (2008); Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules
Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 375, 434 (2006).
115. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 3 (2004), available at
http://www.jc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealset3.pdfl$file/sealset3.pdf ("We
studied all eleven districts whose local rules require good cause to seal a
document. The rate of sealed settlement agreements in those districts was
0.37%.... More than half of the cases with sealed settlement agreements are
either personal injury cases (30%) or employment cases (27%).").
116. See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of
Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 263, 280 (1998) (analyzing secrecy
agreements).
117. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement
Restrictions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1480-81
(2006) (discussing avenues for avoiding secret settlements).
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See Douglas R. Eitel et al., Medicine on Trial. Physicians' Attitudes
About Expert Medical Witnesses, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 345, 351 (1997) ("[Mlany
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seems unlikely that in tort suits, as opposed to contractual disputes,
parties would contract for the application of a particular
jurisdiction's law as some commentators suggest.121
In addition, hospital error incident reports and disciplinary
records are generally not made public.122 The Patient Safety and
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 and its implementing regulations,
though intended to improve treatment, require record keeping of
safety violations and exchange of information to develop better
safety protocols. 2  Despite these mandates, the regulations
explicitly provide for the secrecy of reporting information concerning
medical errors. 24
The federal government requires all physicians who receive
Medicare or Medicaid payments to report all payments made on
behalf of physicians in connection with medical malpractice
settlements or judgments as well as all adverse peer-review actions
against licenses, clinical privileges, and professional society
memberships of physicians and other health care practitioners.125
This data is collected and compiled into the National Practitioner
Data Bank.126 Unfortunately, federal regulations prevent consumers
from looking at the data, a regulatory privilege supported by
extensive American Medical Association ("AMA") lobbying.127
One easy way to quickly evaluate performance is to get a second
opinion. However, given that doctors legally own the physical copies
of patient records,128 it is costly to get easy, convenient "second
states developed medical malpractice review panels to encourage arbitration
and settlement.").
121. See, e.g., Drahozal & Hines, supra note 117, at 1482; Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 327 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)
("Actors may be able to exit state regulation inexpensively by contracting ex
ante for the application of a particular law rather than physically avoiding
regulating states.").
122. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(3) (McKinney 2001); see also Troyen A.
Brennan, Hospital Peer Review and Clinical Privileges Actions: To Report or Not
Report, 282 JAMA 381, 381-82 (1999) (discussing the great discretion hospitals
have to keep physician discipline actions and evaluations secret).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21, -22, 299c-2, -3 (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.204-212
(2010).
124. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 8112, 8113
(proposed Feb. 12, 2008). The regulations state that "[tihese [secrecy]
protections will enable all health care providers, including multi-facility health
care systems, to share data within a protected legal environment, both within
and across states, without the threat of information being used against the
subject providers." Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2006); 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.7-.9 (2010).
126. About Us, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.npdbhipdb.hrsa.gov/topNavigation/aboutUs.jsp (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
127. See Thomas Reardon, Consumer Access to the National Practitioner
Data Bank: Against, 41 HEALTHPLAN 18, 18-19 (2000).
128. Veling W. Tsai, Cheaper and Better: The Congressional Administrative
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opinions." Interestingly, this should be easier in the age of
electronic records. At the very least, with electronic
communications, it should be easy to pay another physician to
review the records or, at least, in certain instances, x-rays or MRI
scans. After all, hospitals send x-rays around the world for review
by Indian radiologists129-why couldn't consumers do the same
thing? Given that physicians own their records and patients only
have access (not control) over them, such review is, in practice,
difficult. 3 0
B. Word of Mouth
Of course, it is not clear that the consensus of laypeople on the
virtues of a given doctor reflects anything but that doctor's
interpersonal skills. Since the time of the priests of Asclepius,
physicians have excelled at giving the impression of concern and
compassion, which may or may not be an accurate signal of quality.
The failure, therefore, of word of mouth stems from doctors' own
reticence to speak frankly to laypeople about their fellow doctors'
skills. This reticence emerges from doctors' own professional culture
as well as the law and regulation that supports and protects it.
Doctor Atul Gawande, the surgeon and a sort of "medical public
intellectual," has written, "As is often the case, the people who were
in the best position to see how dangerous [the surgeon] had become
Simplification Mandate Facilitates the Transition to Electronic Medical
Records, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 549, 557 (1998) ("[C]ourts have continued to
recognize that, although patients have rights to access their treatment records,
the records belong to the physician or to the hospital."); see also McGarry v. J.A.
Mercier Co., 262 N.W. 296, 297 (Mich. 1935) (holding that x-ray "negatives are
the property of the physician or surgeon who has made them incident to
treating a patient").
129. See Nathanial H. Hwang, You've Got Mail: The Concerns of
Electronically Outsourcing Radiological Services Overseas, 25 J. LEGAL MED.
469, 469 (2004); Andrew Pollack, Who's Reading Your X-Ray?, N.Y. TiMES, Nov.
16, 2003, at BUL.
130. As a general rule, under state law, the health care provider owns
medical records and other related materials like x-rays. See, e.g., Gotkin v.
Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859, 863, 866-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v.
Masonic Hosp. Ass'n of Payne Cnty., Okla., 191 F. Supp. 51, 54 (W.D. Okla.
1961); Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp., No. CV9601557795, 1997 WL 430619, at *4-
5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 1997), aff'd, 717 A.2d 140 (Conn. 1998); Cannell v.
Med. & Surgical Clinic, 315 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Waldron v. Ball
Corp., 619 N.Y.S.2d 841, 841 (App. Div. 1994); Wallace v. Univ. Hosps. of
Cleveland, 170 N.E.2d 261, 261-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). Many states provide
for hospital ownership of medical records through statute or regulation. See,
e.g., 28 PA. CODE § 115.28 (2011) ("Medical records are the property of the
hospital, and they shall not be removed from the hospital premises, except for
court purposes."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-304 (2006) (establishing that
hospital records are hospital property). For a more complete listing of cases and
statutes, see Roger E. Harris, Note, The Need To Know Versus the Right To
Know: Privacy of Patient Medical Data in an Information-Based Society, 30
SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 1183, 1190 & n.34 (1997).
[Vol. 4676
HeinOnline  -- 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 76 2011
THE NEW HEALTHCARE LEGISLATION
were in the worst position to do anything about it: junior physicians,
nurses, ancillary staff."'"' Given the nonpublic nature of medical
information, it is essential that those who have access to it also have
incentives to share it, but those in the medical hierarchy's lower
rungs rarely have such incentive. Further, established physicians
also have little incentive to share information. Because doctors refer
patients to one another, they often lack an incentive to offend each
other by giving frank assessments of another doctor's skills. Such
indiscretion may "get back" to their target, drying up a source of
references and revenue.
Perhaps most importantly, given the power of self-regulation
that physicians possess, they can retaliate against each other by
denying each other admission privileges at a hospital and
blackballing each other from professional organizations. The
hostility from other doctors toward physicians who testify for
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases strongly suggests the mafia-
like retribution the medical profession metes out to those who do not
conform to expected-and self-protecting-professional norms.13 2
Finally, because the law gives physicians the power to discipline and
even de-license each other,33 the average physician's incentive to
give frank advice about his or her fellow members of the profession
must be discounted by the possibility that such fellow members may
seek reprisals.
C. Price
Price is arguably the most important signal in a modern
economy; it informs consumers about the cost of producing a given
product or service.' It corresponds to quality, as generally
suppliers could not make any money if they charged more for goods
that failed to provide commensurate value. But, thanks to pervasive
third-party payment regimes, consumers do not pay for health care
directly. 3 Price is invisible and incentives are misaligned. Further,
due to the complications of the third-party-payment regime, hospital
prices are often meaningless artifacts of cross-subsidization and
price discrimination, something that anyone who has ever received a
master bill for a major medical procedure would know. Of course, as
131. ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTE ON AN IMPERFECT
SCIENCE 96 (2002).
132. See Alexis Wood, Professional Oversight of Expert Testimony: Austin v.
American Association of Neurological Surgeons, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Apr. 2005),
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2005/04/pdflhlawl-0504.pdf.
133. See Drew Carlson & James N. Thompson, The Role of State Medical
Boards, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Apr. 2005), http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org
/2005/04/pdf/pforl-0504.pdf.
134. See Friedrick A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 525-26 (1945).
135. See generally Milton Friedman, How To Cure Health Care, PUB. INT.,
Winter 2001, at 1 (discussing third-party-payment regimes).
2011] 77
HeinOnline  -- 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 77 2011
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
is pointed out endlessly in public-policy circles, tax law supports and
subsidizes health insurance; thus law and regulation help to deprive
medical markets of information and to silence a potentially robust
signal. 36
There are deeper reasons why price has failed to be a powerful
signal. Doctors do not like talking about price-and they rarely do-
because such discussion conflicts with their professionalism. 7 Since
the time of Hippocrates, talking about prices has somehow sullied
the quasi-religious role to which doctors often aspire.3 s Less
melodramatically, doctors' failure to discuss price with patients may
simply result from patients' lack of bargaining power. After all,
when doctors deal with a customer that has significant market
power, like the Medicare program, doctors are, in general, quite
vocal about price. 3 1
D. Brand
Brands can serve as powerful signals. Milton Friedman
famously argued that all medical licensure should be eliminated. 40
Rather than have laws that protect consumers from bad doctors,
Friedman envisioned the emergence of prestigious medical firms,
like prestigious banks, that would signal quality.141 In limited
instances, prestigious firms have emerged, like the Mayo Clinic.
Similarly, teaching hospitals associated with medical schools, signal
quality to some degree. However, the Mayo Clinic is the exception
136. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Shalala, 837 F. Supp. 303, 306
(D. Minn. 1993) (recognizing that the part of the Medicare Act known as the
"health insurance program" is funded out of social security taxes).
137. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
138. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 98, at 654 ("Doctors dislike discussing
fees.... [There is] a 'taboo in official American health culture: namely, a
prohibition upon allowing the physician to appear concerned with financial
matters.'" (quoting Howard F. Stein, The Money Taboo in American Medicine,
MED. ANTHROPOLOGY, Fall 1983, at 1, 11)). Professors Hall and Schneider quote
Hippocrates as follows:
Should you begin by discussing fees, you will suggest to the patient
either that you will go away and leave him if no agreement be
reached, or that you will neglect him and not prescribe any immediate
treatment.... I consider such a worry to be harmful to a troubled
patient, particularly if the disease be acute.
Id. at 654 (quoting John Fabre, Medicine as a Profession: Hip, Hip, Hippocrates:
Extracts from The Hippocratic Doctor, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1669, 1669-70 (1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. The AMA's lobbying and publicity campaigns concerning Medicare's
reimbursement schedules, as well as the reimbursement schedules of private
insurers, are notorious. See Sarah Rubenstein, Medicare Patients Struggle To
Find Primary Care Docs, WALL. ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Dec. 9, 2008, 9:13 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/12/09/medicare-patients-struggle-to-find
-primary-care-docs/?mod=googlenews-wsj.
140. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE: A
PERSONAL STATEMENT 228-47 (1980).
141. See id.
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to the rule, and wide variations exist in the quality of research
institutions. 2 It is quite clear that no evidence establishes that
care in teaching hospitals is per se better than in nonteaching
hospitals.4 3 Doctors have not branded themselves for reasons that
are not clear to this author.
E. Advertising
Another important quality signal is advertising. As Professor
Phillip Nelson first observed, expensive advertisement campaigns
can be seen as indicating quality because consumers are more likely
to be repeat buyers of quality goods and, therefore, it makes
economic sense for purveyors of quality goods to make the "first
sale" and do so by getting the attention of consumers through
advertising.144
Notions of professionalism-indeed, the AMA's Code of Ethics-
at one time prohibited doctors from advertising.145 Even after the
Supreme Court struck down the AMA's ban as violating antitrust
laws,46 doctors did not start advertising.4  It is still relatively
rare,4 8 and is perhaps found most commonly in connection with
cosmetic surgery and other elective procedures such as refractive
eye surgery.
Contractual incentive structures can also act as a signal. 4  If a
car comes with a warranty, it signals the seller's belief that the car
is good; otherwise, the seller would lose money. Other contractual
142. See, e.g., Shukri F. Khuri et al., Comparison of Surgical Outcomes
Between Teaching and Nonteaching Hospitals in the Department of Veterans
Affairs, 234 ANNALS SURGERY 370, 374 (2001) (finding higher mortality rates in
teaching hospitals than in nonteaching hospitals).
143. See Justin B. Dimick et al., Hospital Teaching Status and Outcomes of
Complex Surgical Procedures in the United States, 139 ARCHIVES SURGERY 137,
140-41 (2004).
144. Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcON. 729, 732
(1974); see also Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of
Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986) (positing a formal model of
advertisements' signaling function).
145. Robert L. Martensen, Physician Advertising, 272 JAMA 1623, 1623
(1994).
146. See Am. Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S.
676 (1982).
147. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 98, at 653-54.
148. See John A. Rizzo & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Advertising and the Price,
Quantity, and Quality of Primary Care Physician Services, 27 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 381, 388 n.12 (1992) (finding that "physician price advertising
continues to be quite rare," because the FTC seldom receives complaints about
price advertising by physicians, and polls show that "physicians are strongly
opposed to price advertising").
149. See Sanford Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and
Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981)
(discussing the role warranties play in signaling product quality); Spence, supra
note 13, at 561-62, 569-71 (same).
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signals indicating quality include a "no questions asked" return
policy or, as contractors often employ, a partial payment schedule in
which the buyer only pays upon successful completion of certain,
agreed-upon stages.
The medical contract-pay for services, not results-is not only
a moral hazard in that it allows the provider to give less than
excellent care and still get paid, but it signals nothing except,
perhaps, mediocrity. As the previous Part discussed, this contract
did not emerge from market forces but resulted from judicial
regulation and professional self-interest.
F. Certification and Professionalism
Of course, the one signal of quality that the law does permit,
and actually creates, is credentialing and the culture of
professionalism that grows up around it. The law limits, as
discussed in Part I, who can practice medicine. The public
justification for these limits is to protect the public from
mountebanks and quacks. Regulation is supposed to permit only
qualified people to practice medicine and, thus, the credential
should signal quality.so Medicine in the United States offers a
bewildering m6lange of credentialing and certifying organizations,
from the hundreds of medical schools and programs for
credentialing foreign-trained doctors, to programs for physician
specialty board certification, to hospital accrediting organizations
like the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO")."'
By definition, credentialing only permits a bargain basement
type of signaling-a person who has an M.D. and has passed his or
her certifying exams satisfies a minimal level of competence.
Credentialing and certification fails to provide more fine-grained
distinctions. Moreover, it limits other types of signaling, i.e.,
designations of other types of health care professionals who could do
some of the tasks currently performed by licensed medical doctors
but who cannot demonstrate their competence.
More problematically, credentialing encourages, indeed,
150. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of
Regulation To Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525, 525
(1988) ("Assuring the quality of the care provided by medical professionals and
institutions has been a concern of the law from ancient times.").
151. About two-dozen medical specialties have certifying boards recognized
by the American Board of Medical Specialties. Specialties & Subspecialties:
Recognized Physician Specialty and Subspecialty Certificates, AM. BD. MED.
SPECIALTIES, http://www.abms.org/who we~help/physicians/specialties.aspx
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011). The JCAHO accredits hospitals, nursing homes,
psychiatric hospitals, hospices, and other health care institutions. See Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private
Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 841
(1983).
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arguably creates or reifies, what can only be described as primitive,
cultic attitudes toward medicine.15 2 Some argue that a professional
calling, as defined and created by credentialing, somehow
transforms normal, self-interested service providers into
professionals who will presumably ignore their self-interest,
pecuniary gain, or other utility, in the name of their calling.153
Indeed, some have argued that this special status is essential
because it elicits trust and because
[a] patient's confidence and trust in a care provider obviously
is central to this charismatic healing power. "The image of
omnipotence is an essential component of the healer." Deep-
seated trust appears to activate a patient's own, internal
healing mechanisms-mechanisms that are still largely
undiscovered and unexplained [undiscovered,
indeed]. ... [Slociety recognizes the healing powers of a
professional elite (physicians or shamans), who administer
personally to the patient with physical touching and healing
agents (drugs or herbs) ....
... Trust in the healer is elevated by the healer's status
in society.154
While undoubtedly placebo effects caused by confidence in
providers' "healing powers," play an enormous role in getting people
to feel better, the notion that law should work through credentialing
and other mechanisms to create a class of "shamans" trained to
elicit feelings of wellness seems medieval in its antirationalism.
It is true, as discussed below, that relatively little of medical
practice boasts a rigorous scientific basis, and that medicine, as
currently practiced, is certainly not a pure science. But, that does
not mean that legal policy and contract law should reinforce, even
reify, a faith-based approach to medicine. To the contrary, it should
encourage evidence-based treatment to render medicine as
scientifically predictable, indeed merely technical, as possible. More
to the point, if the challenge for law and medicine truly is to provide
"trust," other signals, like contractual warranties, probably can do a
better job. Whom would one trust more-preening doctors
displaying their "charismatic healing power" or doctors who will eat
their fees if they fail to deliver promised outcomes?
On the other hand, to the degree that professionalism creates
special reputational costs, it can be a signal. If physicians, due to
152. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463,
480-81 (2002) (discussing the traits ascribed to doctors over the course of
history).
153. See W. Glannon & L.F. Ross, Are Doctors Altruistic?, 28 J. MED. ETIcs
68, 68 (2002) (identifying commentators who make this argument).
154. Hall, supra note 152, at 480, 481 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ERIC J.
CASSELL, THE HEALER'S ART 141 (1976)).
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their status and position, which credentialing helps create, place a
greater value on their reputation, then physicians can be expected to
behave in ways consistent with promoting their reputation."55 That
would mean they would act in ways that would always make it
appear as if they were acting in patients' best interests. If
professionalism-and credentialing, which helps create the special
mission of a profession-did make a physician's reputation more
valuable, then professionalism would be a powerful and informative
signal.
But it is far from clear that reputation functions effectively in
large populations or in occupations like medicine in which
information is scarce and unreliable and interactions between
doctors and patients are often infrequent."' In other words, we
might expect professionalism to function as an effective signal in a
small town in which everyone knew about a doctor's reputation, and
that public perception was relatively accurate. In those
circumstances, doctors with bad reputations would be "punished"
with smaller practices. However, medicine as practiced today is
often anonymous, institutionalized, and bureaucratized. It is far
from clear that professionalism would function as an effective signal
of quality.
G. Comparative Performance
As the largest single payer of health care in the country through
Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans Administration, the federal
government has in its possession information about which doctors
perform which procedures and in what quantities. This information
could be used, among other ways, to see whether doctors were giving
appropriate care, overusing certain treatments, or, in general,
providing care consistent with that given by other physicians with
similar patient loads. While the conclusions that could be drawn
from the federal government's information would not be perfectly
precise, as a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 7 disclosure could
not match diagnoses and services with specific patients, this
information could clearly give some insight into particular doctors'
prescription practices. This insight could be used to see how well
physicians appear to be following the most current practices-as
well as whether they perform services for which they are qualified,
i.e., whether non-Board certified physicians are performing typically
specialist-performed procedures. At the very least, it would show
155. See ERic A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 13, 65, 187 (2000)
(providing a classic account of the relationship between law and norms, and
examining how reputation encourages prosocial behavior).
156. See Andrew Fichter, The Law of Doctoring: A Study of the Codification
of Medical Professionalism, 19 HEALTH MATRIx 317, 381-82 (2009) (noting the
contradictory nature of modem medical professionalism).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
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the experience that physicians have in performing certain
procedures-a key indicator of quality.
This information would be clearly helpful to consumers. After
all, if you were hiring a contractor to build a house, you would
probably be interested in whether other contractors used the same
concrete, used similar building materials, etc. Yet, ingrained
assumptions about medical information have led courts to block the
disclosure of comparative practice styles. An important
administrative law case involving the FOIA powerfully provides a
quite recent example of this resistance.158 A consumer organization,
Consumers' Checkbook, attempted to use the FOIA to obtain
information concerning Medicare claims-specifically, diagnoses and
type and place of service that certain physicians made or provided in
2004. 15
If this information regarding Medicare claims involved any
other government contract or purchase, release of this information
would likely be automatic. The Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS"), however, refused to release the data under
Exemption 6 of the FOIA,160 which states that its disclosure
requirement "does not apply to matters that [involve] . . . personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.',161
Courts have read this exception to apply to information, such as
Medicare reimbursements, which would "in some cases allow for an
inference to be drawn about the financial situation of an
individual."62 Here, HHS feared that the data could be used to
allow people to guess at individual physicians' salaries and it
concluded that this privacy violation outweighed disclosure's public
benefit. 163
Consumers' Checkbook won in the district court; HHS
appealed.'" Not surprisingly, the AMA, assuming the role of enemy
of medical consumerism, intervened to support HHS's refusal to
disclose.165  The court of appeals, in a divided panel decision,
reversed the district court and upheld HHS's original decision,
concluding that there was a "substantial privacy interest in the total
payments [doctors] receive from Medicare" but a "non-existent
158. Consumers' Checkbook, Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 554 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
159. Id. at 1048-49.
160. See id. at 1049.
161. § 552(b)(6).
162. Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1230 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
163. See Brief for Federal Appellant at 12-13, Consumers' Checkbook, 554
F.3d 1046 (No. 07-5343).
164. See Consumers' Checkbook, 554 F.3d at 1049-50.
165. See id at 1049-50, 1060.
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public interest" in revealing the data. '66
This bizarre conclusion reflects an indifference to medical
consumerism and, indeed, an ignorance about the role of
information in assuring functional markets. As Judge Judith
Rogers wrote in dissent, "[T]here is a commanding and important
public interest in disclosure of the data the Center seeks."67 Indeed,
the court arrived at its conclusion through flawed logic-and a flatly
erroneous understanding of FOIA precedent-that seemed designed
to undercut the notion of patients as consumers.
The court's analysis began with a narrow reading of the FOIA's
purpose as a mandate for disclosure that .'contribut[es] significantly
to public understanding of the operations or activities of the
government.',,16 8 Under this reasoning, it examined certain, quite
specifically defined HHS statutory missions, such as "promoting the
effective, efficient, and economical delivery of health care services,
and. .. promoting the quality of services of the type for which
payment may be made,"69 as well as the statutory purpose of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), the
subdivision of HHS that collects the sought-after information.o70
CMS also has responsibilities to promote quality, enroll health care
providers in the Medicare program, and ensure providers'
eligibility.
As the dissent pointed out, the court's entire approach-finding
specific "statutory duties" and examining whether disclosure would
further them-is rather beside the point."' The FOIA's purpose is to
shed light on the operations or activities of government, and
spending money is certainly one of those activities.'73  "Because
Medicare 'distributes extensive amounts of public funds,' there is a
'special need' for public oversight of HHS's activities in
administering Medicare.""7 What could be more basic to its core
mission than how it reimburses doctors?17'
166. Id. at 1051, 1056.
167. Id. at 1059 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 1051 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. Dep't of
Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994)).
169. Id. at 1051-52 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(g) (2006)).
170. See id. at 1049, 1052.
171. See id. at 1052-53.
172. See id. at 1059, 1061 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
173. See id. at 1059.
174. Id. (quoting Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1232
(D.C. Cir. 2008)).
175. The majority's narrow definition of statutory purposes, moreover, is
incorrect under controlling precedent interpreting "public interest" under
Exemption 6 of the FOIA. The court used the following test: "The only relevant
public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would service the
core purpose of the FOIA, which is contribut[ing] significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government." Id. at 1051
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Even under its incorrectly narrowed definition of public
interest, which required a connection between specific statutory
purposes and disclosure, the court's reasoning was contradictory and
flawed. First, Citizens' Checkbook argued that the release would
further HHS's performance of its mission to promote quality health
care for Medicare beneficiaries-specifically, that "the requested
data [would] indicate the quality of care Medicare patients are
receiving. The court stated, however, that the "medical
community has not reached a consensus on whether the number of
procedures performed by a physician correlates to the quality of
those procedures.""'
This court is simply wrong; there is a consensus. Indeed, the
article on which the court relied for the assertion that the profession
lacks consensus in fact builds on that consensus, which a cursory
reading would have revealed."' The article, Is Volume Related to
Outcome in Health Care? A Systematic Review and Methodologic
Critique of the Literature, states (as the court quotes) that "[t]wenty
years of research have established that, for some procedures and
conditions, higher volume among hospitals and physicians is
associated with better outcomes. However, the magnitude of the
(majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Def. v. Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This is uncontroversial.
However, the court continued, "The requested information must 'shed[]
light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties.'" Id. (quoting U.S.
Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773
(1989)). This further qualification has no support in precedent. The Supreme
Court first applied this language to Exemption 6, which is less protective of
privacy than is Exemption 7. See Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir.
1992) ("Where law-enforcement records are sought (Exemption 7(C)), the
threatened invasion of privacy need not be as likely as where personnel,
medical, or similar files are at issue (Exemption 6).").
This language that the Consumers' Checkbook court used was part of a
very different test. The test that the Supreme Court adopted requires
disclosure if the information is related to the agency's statutory duties, but that
requirement is only a subset of the greater disclosure requirement: the "citizens'
right to be informed about what their government is up to." Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 495 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. at 773) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bibles v. Or.
Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997) ("That is inconsistent with
our opinion in Department of Defense v. FLRA ... which said that the only
relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which
disclosure of the information sought would she[d] light on an agency's
performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their
government is up to." (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. at 497) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Through selective
quotation, the D.C. Circuit changed this test and only looked at whether
disclosure is related to an agency's statutory duties.
176. Consumers' Checkbook, 554 F.3d at 1052.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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relationship varies greatly among individual procedures and
conditions."'1 9 The article goes on to state, in a section the court did
not quote, that "[w]e found that 71% of all studies of hospital volume
and 69% of studies of physician volume reported a statistically
significant association between higher volume and better health
outcomes. No study documented a statistically significant
association between higher volume and worse outcomes.,,1se
As a throw-away point, the court stated that "[elven assuming a
strong correlation between volume and quality, the data CSS
requests will not indicate total volume because it does not include
procedures performed by physicians for non-Medicare patients."18a
The court seemed to make the contradictory claim that Medicare
volume is so informative that disclosure would allow patients to
guess at doctors' salaries-and therefore commit an impermissible
privacy violation-yet is insufficiently informative as to allow
consumers to draw conclusions about the appropriateness of a
physician's prescribing or treatment practices.
V. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN MEDICAL CONTRACT
Some might argue that mandating warranties constitutes an
unwarranted interference in the market. Medical services have
developed without warranties and likely reflect certain efficiencies
that regulatory meddling could upset, or so the argument goes. The
problem with that argument is that casual examination of the
history of the medical contract reveals the workings of the political
economy, not the free-market economy.
Throughout history, contracts for medical services have differed
from contracts for other services. In the Middle Ages, doctors, like
lawyers, did not have a legal right to fees for their services. 182 The
law classified payments to professionals, such as doctors or lawyers,
as gifts, and these professionals had no action at law to compel
payment. '3 Presumably, only services that satisfied the consumer
prompted a "gift," and therefore, unhappy results did not require
payment. Resultant damages were not part of the equation.
Amusingly, the medieval notion of conditional payment is consistent
with this Article's position that physicians should only receive
payment if they are successful. During the past three to four
centuries, however, physicians and other professionals gained a
179. Ethan A. Halm et al., Is Volume Related to Outcome in Health Care? A
Systematic Review and Methodologic Critique of the Literature, 137 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 511, 517 (2002).
180. Id. at 514.
181. Consumers' Checkbook, 554 F.3d at 1052-53.
182. See Catherine Crawford, Patients' Rights and the Law of Contract in
Eighteenth-Century England, 13 Soc. HIST. MED. 381, 392-95 (2000).
183. JOHN ORDRONAUX, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDICINE IN ITs RELATIONS TO
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, TORTS, AND EVIDENCE 34-35 (The Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2007) (1869).
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legally enforceable right to their fees.'" This shift raised the
question of what should happen when a physician fails to bring
about a cure. Malpractice's standard of care emerged as the judicial
rule for determining whether the law would provide a remedy for
such a medical failure.8 5
Blackstone categorized mala practice not under contract or
mercantile (business) law, but as a special class of personal wrongs,
like trespass or assault.18 6  Blackstone so classified malpractice
because "it breaks the trust which the party placed in his
physician."' 7 Under this legal conception, the physician did not
guarantee results. Instead, the medical relationship only required
"ordinary diligence, care, and skill," but that standard of care was
read into every contract and could not be waived. American courts
arrived at this standard by the 1830s, at which time a proliferation
of suits occurred along with the rise of the modern concept of
negligence for all torts."' Indeed, the "standard of care," which looks
to what the average practitioner within a given geographic area
would have done, has largely remained unchanged over the last two
centuries.
The current malpractice standard of care did not descend from
Blackstone in a direct, unquestioning line. Rather, during the early
and mid-1800s, some courts looked to contract law as the remedy for
failed medical treatment.'" These courts reasoned that the medical
contract was like any other business contract.'90 Doctors only had to
provide that standard of care for which they had bargained in the
contract. An often-litigated aspect of this shift to contract was
whether courts should accept contractual waivers of liability to bar
malpractice litigation-or requirements that patients post bonds in
184. See Crawford, supra note 182, at 392-95.
185. See JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 112-14 (1993); James C. Mohr, American
Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective, 283 JAMA 1731, 1732-
33 (2000).
186. KENNETH ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA: ORIGINS AND LEGACY 6 (1990).
187. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 122 (1768)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See id. at 5-7; James C. Mohr, The Emergence of Medical Malpractice
in America, 14 TRANSACTIONS & STUD. C. PHYSICIANS PHILA. 1, 10-14 (1992).
189. See, e.g., Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene 441 (Iowa 1848); Leighton v.
Sargent, 31 N.H. 119 (1853) (holding a surgeon liable but applying a contract-
type analysis); see also Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error:
The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1193,
1198 n.20 (noting that many courts referred to the physician's obligation as
"aris[ing] from a contract 'implied by law'"). Commentators like Professor
Silver call this contract language a "legal fiction." See, e.g., id. Yet as Professor
Kenneth De Ville argues, it reasonably reflects the laissez-faire, democratic
attitudes of the early nineteenth century. DE VILLE, supra note 186, at 171.
190. See Bowman, 1 Greene 441; Leighton, 31 N.H. 119.
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the case of a malpractice suit.191
Whether to treat the medical contract as governed simply by the
agreement between the parties or by a special duty of care emerged
as a hotly contested issue in the 1850s, not only within the law but
also in the public sphere.192 Given the explosion of medical
malpractice suits in the prior decades, doctors debated, both in
medical journals and the general press, the wisdom of malpractice
and contractual waivers. Consistently throughout this debate,
physicians-especially prominent physicians and those involved in
organized medicine-resisted the contract model of liability.194
Leading physicians publicly criticized the contract model and called
for the older standard of care. For instance, Worthington Hooker,
the vice president of the AMA in 1864 and professor of medicine at
Yale University, wrote, "The relation[ship] of a physician to his
employers is not shut up within the narrow limits of mere pecuniary
considerations [and it should not be] subjected to the changes
incident to the common relations of trade and commerce among
men."'9 ' Valentine Mott, a leading surgeon, and John Ordronaux, a
physician, lawyer, and author of the leading treatise on law and
medicine, expressed similar views, as did a Massachusetts medical
society committee on malpractice.xse
Why did doctors defend higher standards of liability, despite the
rapid increase of malpractice suits in the 1850s and 1860s and
physicians' harsh denunciation of this litigation? Doctors and their
professional organizations complained loudly in their own
publications and in the broader public discussion about the rising
tide of litigation. In refrains remarkably similar to those of today,
doctors decried the high costs that malpractice suits impose and
ominously warned of the depletion of the physician supply that
191. See DE VILLE, supra note 186, at 177-79.
192. See Mohr, supra note 185, at 1733-36.
193. See id. at 1733, 1736 ("Mid-century medical journals were full of letters
and articles from obviously stunned, sometimes bitter, and frequently irate
physicians who regard the spread of malpractice litigation as a quasi-
revolutionary assault.... American physicians, however, did not want to be
classified with boilermakers and other nonprofessional occupations. . . they
maintained that the patient-physician relationship could never be a contract
between equals. . . .").
194. DE VILLE, supra note 186, at 166 ("Doctors generally resisted the notion
of contractual relationships with patients because it conflicted with the image of
the physician as a public servant with a distinct social status."); see also Case of
Mal-practice, Bos. MED. & SURGICAL J., Mar. 13, 1856, at 109, 112 ("[T]o make a
written contract with the patient before proceeding to take charge of
him... . [iut may be objected that, in the first course, such refusals would be
considered inhuman; and in the second, it is undignified for a well-qualified
profession to resort to such expedients.").
195. DE VILLE, supra note 186, at 181 (quoting WORTHINGTON HOOKER,
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 410 (Arno Press & The N.Y. Times 1972) (1849))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. at 181-82.
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malpractice would induce.1 7 Yet, despite their bitter antagonism
toward malpractice, doctors resisted lower standards of legal
liability.
Recognizing the parlous state of the medical profession can
explain this seeming puzzle. By the mid-1800s, most state
governments had adopted a true laissez-faire attitude toward
licensing, a policy that emerged from fundamental shifts in
American democracy. During earlier colonial times, physicians were
generally highly educated individuals from the upper classes, and
strict licensure laws adopted from England limited those who could
practice."" The Jacksonian period, as part of a democratization of
all the professions, marked the abolition of most licensure
requirements adopted from Europe.'99  In the early and mid-
nineteenth century, therefore, an enormous number of medical
schools sprang up, often "diploma mill"-type operations.20 0
In addition, many individuals became practitioners of what we
would likely term "alternative medicines," like the Thomsonians,
who advocated the therapeutic importance of steam infused with
herbs; the reformed Thomsonians, who held slightly different
beliefs; homeopaths; botanic healers; as well as "Broussaisian,
Sangradorian, and Morrisonian" healers. 20' These practitioners
opposed licensure requirements, creating tension between the
"regular" physicians and the "nonregular" followers of these
"alternative" practices.202 Perhaps most importantly, additional
competition from the nonregulars severely depressed fees, and
doctors' income and prestige fell during this period.203
As a reaction, "regular physicians" attempted to establish
themselves as the science-based authority-those deserving of
special legal protections and privileges as distinct from these
various "alternative" approaches. They formed medical societies,
published journals, worked for higher standards in practice and
education-and toward elimination and isolation of alternative
197. See Mohr, supra note 185, at 1736. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
medical malpractice crises are not only the children of present times. See
Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice:
The Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451 (1988).
198. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
OF NATIONAL POLIcY, 1800-1900, at 32 (1978) (recounting the typical
characteristics of physicians).
199. DE VILLE, supra note 186, at 171. Often the licensure laws were not
repealed in their entirety. Instead, only the penalty clauses were eliminated.
See Ronald Hamowy, The Early Development of Medical Licensing Laws in the
United States, 1875-1900, 3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 73, 104 n.2 (1979).
200. MOHR, supra note 198, at 33.
201. HENRY BURNELL SHAFER, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION 1783 TO
1850, at 201-02 (1936).
202. WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY: FROM SECTS TO SCIENCE 145(1972).
203. MOHR, supra note 198, at 34.
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therapies.20 For instance, the Massachusetts Medical Society, in its
official publication, The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal
(which was eventually renamed The New England Journal of
Medicine), regularly decried nonregulars as quacks and called for
205their isolation.
Regular physicians founded the AMA in 1847.206 They used
their group to push for regulation of economic competition and
delegitimization of homeopaths and users of patent medicines, like
the Thomsonians.2 07 The AMA efforts to stigmatize and isolate
nonregular physicians seems remarkable. For instance, the AMA
refused to admit African-American physicians because they
belonged to the "National Medical Society of the District of
Columbia," a group that included nonregulars. 208  The regular
physicians eventually successfully lobbied state legislatures to
renew and strengthen licensure requirements.20 9 While these boards
had joint membership of regular physicians and the various other
types of medical practitioners, regular physicians, through a
strengthened AMA, began to set educational standards that largely
eliminated nonregular medicine.1 o
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the regular physicians had bigger fish to fry than establishing
favorable liability standards. They had to establish themselves as
the sole providers, the sole source of legitimate medical
knowledge.21 1 If greater tort liability were part of the logic of their
204. Id. at 33-34.
205. Connection of Druggists with Quack Medicines, Bos. MED. & SURGICAL
J., May 30, 1854, at 340, 342 ("If [quackery's] continued presence from the dark
ages had not rendered it familiar, if habit had not blunted our sense of its
depravity, if it could now be presented in all its deformity before a civilized
community for the first time, it would be regarded with wonder at its audacity,
with execration at its reckless tampering with the best temporal interests of
humanity."); Medical Education, Bos. MED. & SURGICAL J., Apr. 29, 1858, at
264, 265 ("[O]nly by offering to the public a body of well-instructed physicians
that we can successfully oppose the thousand forms of empiricism with which
the community is deluged."); The Economy of Medical Association, Bos. MED. &
SURGICAL J., Feb. 12, 1851, at 2, 30-34 (critiquing allopathy).
206. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 202, at 198; Our History, AM. MED. ASS'N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/about-ama/our-history.shtml (last visited
Jan. 28, 2011).
207. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 202, at 200.
208. Morris Fishbein, History of the American Medical Association, in A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 1847 TO 1947, at 19, 80-81
(Morris Fishbein ed., 1947).
209. MOHR, supra note 198, at 34; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 202, at 310.
210. RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650-
1965, at 60-76 (1967).
211. Indeed, this episode really does seem to illustrate Michel Foucault's
theory that medical authority is, in fact, created through a social process of
legitimizing certain politically powerful interests' claims to knowledge. See
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL
PERCEPTION 245-46 (A.M. Sheridan trans., Routledge Classics 2003) (1963).
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special professional calling, then they called for greater tort liability.
Supporting this theory, many of the fiercest physician
opponents of the contract model played a significant role in early
organized medicine, furthering regular medicine both politically and
institutionally. For instance, Valentine Mott, quoted above, who
was president of the New York University Medical College and was
known as the "Father of Vascular Surgery," urged the founding of
the New York Academy of Medicine.1 This group's "primary
purpose was the separation of regular from irregular physicians."212
Another early force in the AMA, Worthington Hooker, who, as
mentioned above served as its vice president, wrote Physician and
Patient, which decries the Thomsonians as quacks.214 The
Massachusetts Medical Society ("Society"), the oldest "regular"
physician society in the country, in an official report stated that "[ilt
cannot be conducive to the interests of the patient that his relation
with his physician should be reduced to a mere business transaction,
to be judged as a contract, to which the employer strictly holds the
employed."212 The Society took steps in the 1850s to expel
nonregulars and, as discussed above, issued a report condemning
216the use of contracts to govern liability between patient and doctor.
This Article does not claim that these physicians used the
standard of care as part of any conscious "secret agenda." Rather,
special standards of liability logically followed from their vision of
medicine as an occupation with distinct ethical responsibilities and
unique qualifications-standards that should receive special legal
protections. As they would argue, the law could not allow anyone
without training or certification to practice medicine, so those who
practiced medicine could not be held to the mere contractual
standards of performance that bound other businesses.
Medical malpractice liability can be viewed as a "deal" in the
political economy: physicians received the benefits of licensure or a
"guild monopoly" in exchange for adopting a higher standard of
care.217  The recent trends to limit medical malpractice liability
This is particularly true because the treatments of both the "regular doctors"
and the quacks were equally ineffective, with the latters' treatment option often
preferable at least from a patient's perspective. For instance, the "standard"
treatment for gall stones was ingestion of mercury-based purgatives. The
Thomsonians recommended breathing rosemary-infused steam. See
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 202, at 132-35, for a discussion of Samuel Thomson's
herbal approach to medicine and rejection of the use of poisons such as mercury
in the treatment of illness.
212. JOSEPH F. KET1, THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION:
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 1780-1860, at 168-69 (1968).
213. Id. at 169.
214. HOOKER, supra note 195, at 103-19.
215. DE VILLE, supra note 186, at 181.
216. See id.
217. It has been argued, for instance, that the AMA, through such vehicles
as the Flexner Report and control of medical school admissions, worked to limit
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through caps on noneconomic damages or through other procedural
barriers renege on that contract.218  At the very least, consumers
should receive in relaxed licensure laws what they have lost in less
generous liability standards.
This historical analysis suggests that medicine's standard-of-
care-liability rule emerged from intrusive judicial regulation and
physicians' professional self-interest working in the political
economy. It is far from clear that this liability standard best serves
the economic and informational nature of the medical contract.
CONCLUSION: MARKETS, HEALTH CARE, AND CONSUMERS
The "health care crisis" and all its subsidiary crises-the
"medical malpractice crisis," "the exploding health care cost crisis,"
and "the uninsured crisis"-exist within the greater problem of
medical ineffectiveness, which, in turn, results from the failure of
powerful quality signals to emerge in medical contracts. If law
required mandated warranties, they might emerge as effective
quality signals. This in turn would lead to patients making cost-
effective decisions about their health care, which in turn would
control costs-and possibly eliminate the need for medical
malpractice.
Rather than strengthen consumers' power, the new health care
legislation empowers bureaucracy to make decisions on consumers'
behalf. The Health Care Act creates bureaucratic entities, such as
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute and the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services Innovation, to determine what
constitutes effective health care and to build incentives into
reimbursement schemes. In a strange mirror, the procontract
commentators want to give more power to providers, MCOs, and
health-insurance companies.219 Both solutions disregard the role of
physician supply. See Reuben A. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of
Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 267 (1970).
218. David Hyman, Caps Table, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://volokh.com/files/davidh-Caps Tablejpg (displaying a chart listing state
caps on medical malpractice); see also MICHELLE M. MELLO, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND EFFECT OF STATE TORT REFORMS (2006)
(discussing, in part, statutory caps).
219. See, e.g., Reinker & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 275-76 ("[If insurers
could recover all malpractice liability they] might change the type and burden
of proof for establishing malpractice. Because the insurers would presumably
seek to employ ever more reliable assessments of malpractice claims, they could
come to rely more heavily on refined professional criteria and correspondingly
rigorous scientific methodology and evidence-such as ... sophisticated
statistical and epidemiological studies-than is standard practice in the current
system of lay adjudication. This reliance on professional criteria and scientific
evidence and the desire for greater accuracy in malpractice determinations
could also motivate further reforms, such as use of expert decision makers in
place of lay jurors and judges to resolve claims. For example, insurers could
convene panels of qualified physicians and other experts to arbitrate or
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patients in making choices.
The question that this Article cannot completely answer is
whether effective warranties would emerge if health care providers
were only required to provide what this Article advocates as
"flexible" or "variable" warranties. It is conceivable that, due to
market power or other reasons, providers would only offer the bare
minimum of warranties. This might counsel for making the right of
recovery assignable under any warranty to a MCO or insurance
company or, perhaps, to some third-party-claim aggregator. Or, it
may suggest that warranties would not work, and that physicians
would only offer the barest of guarantees even to large purchasers of
health care.
Before one concludes that reading this Article was a waste of
time, it is instructive to examine those areas in which warranties
have emerged and are fairly widespread: refractive eye surgery and
fertility treatments.22 These are procedures for which insurance
and other third-party payers generally do not reimburse and for
which there are clear metrics for success. While not all of areas of
medicine enjoy such clarity, many do. Consider the warranty
offered by an ophthalmologist in Colorado Springs: it involved a
specific metric ("Dr. Buckley guarantees qualified candidates that
they will be able to read the 20/20 line, or better, on the vision
chart") and varied according to the patient ("Of course Dr. Buckley
can't offer a money back guarantee to you personally until he knows
your vision objectives and confirms that your eye health and present
vision characteristics are likely to allow you to achieve 20/20",).221
Fertility treatments have similar restrictions, only offering
warranties to individuals with certain fertility characteristics (age,
egg quality, etc.) and providing a clear success metric (a baby).222
This evidence strongly suggests that a system of mandatory, but
flexible, medical warranties will be most successful in those areas of
medicine that have clear metrics and identifiable patient risks. It
also points to the emergence of warranties in other areas of
medicine as providers have the incentive to discover clear metrics
and relevant patient risks, particularly in medical markets in which
lawmakers permit access to information about provider quality and
competence.
adjudicate questions of liability and sanctions for medical malpractice.").
220. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
221. See 20/20 Guaranteed LASIK, supra note 61.
222. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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